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Article 4

et al.: Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings in Minnesota

NOTES
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS IN MINNESOTA
Maintaining the integrity of the judciary is important to society because of the
predominantposition occupied byjudges. Historically,judicialdisciplinaryprocedures were seldom used and thus were an inejctive response tojudicialmisconduct.
In an effort to improvejudicalconduct, the Minnesota Legislature in 1971 established the Minnesota Board on JudicialStandards and delegated to it broad authonty to investigate and recommend disciphne for improper fud'iIal conduct.
While Minnesota's present proceduresgenerally comply with due process,further
amendments to theprocedures are necessary if they are to provide maximum protection of the constitutionalrights of the persons involved This Note traces the progression ofjudicial disciplinar procedures both in generaland in Minnesota and
further suggests changes to bring Minnesota procedures in line with due process
requirements.
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V I.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Judges perform a unique role in society.I They serve as trustees of the
public 2 and are expected to be the exemplars of dignity and impartiality.3 A judge is expected to supervise litigation with scrupulous fairness 4
and to apply the law fairly and objectively to the case before him. 5 The
judiciary must be independent and honorable; 6 free from interference or
control by all but the judicial establishment. 7 Because of the enormous
importance of the position, society necessarily exacts high standards from
the judiciary. 8 A judge is expected to maintain and enforce, as well as
observe, these high standards. 9
1. Comment,Judical Dzscoph'ne, Removal, and Retirement, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 563, 563
("judiciary serves a unique role in the social framework").
2. See G. WINTERS & R. HANSON, Preface to SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL DisciPLINE AND REMOVAL (G. Winters ed. 1973).
3. See United States v. Cruz, 455 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972); cf.Nordmann v. National Hotel Co., 425 F.2d 1103, 1109 (5th Cir. 1970) (conduct
of trial judges must be measured by standard of fairness and impartiality).
4. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1293 (5th Cir.) (judges vow to be
fair), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 544 (8th Cir.)
(particular emphasis placed on judges conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and
impartiality), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
5. See Lawton v. Tarr, 327 F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (judge must read and
interpret law as written); In re Judge, 357 So. 2d 172, 179 (Fla. 1978) ("Judges are required
to follow the law and apply it fairly and objectively to all who appear before them"); G.
WINTERS & R. HANSON, supra note 2.

The Lawton court stated:
The beginning of intellectual honesty in a judge is the recognition that, like
other men, he has his own predelictions and preferences and intellectual and
philosophical attitudes that color and influence his viewpoints. . . . [Nevertheless] he must read, interpret and apply laws as written without regard to whether
he would like to see them changed.
327 F. Supp. at 671-72.
6. In re Hammond, 224 Kan. 745, 745-46, 585 P.2d 1066, 1066 (1978) ("independent
and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society"); In re Laster, 404 Mich.
449, 462, 274 N.W.2d 742, 746 (1979) (judiciary must be independent and honest).
7. See Bonafield v. Cahill, 125 N.J. Super. 78, 84, 308 A.2d 386, 389 (1973) ("hallmark of a judge is his independence and freedom from interference and control by any
authority outside the judicial establishment"); cf In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 199, 267
N.W.2d 914, 922 (1978) (judge should act to preserve image ofjudiciary as independent).
8. Cf. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 544 (8th Cir.) ("We demand . . .of every
trial judge in this circuit, a high standard of judicial performance"), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
976 (1972).
9. See In re Hammond, 224 Kan. 745, 746, 585 P.2d 1066, 1066-67 (1978) ("A judge
should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing, and should himself observe,
high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be
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When a judge's conduct offends the standards expected of the judiciary, 10 such conduct may taint the public's image of the judiciaryll as
well as hamper the administration of justice.12 To maintain the public's
confidence in the courts, 13 to insure the effective administration of juspreserved .... A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary."); In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 199, 267 N.W.2d 914, 922
(1978) ("[A] judge... is bound to strive toward creating and preserving the image of the
justice system as an independent, impartial source of reasoned actions and decisions.
Achievement of this goal demands that a judge, in a sense, behave as though he is always
on the bench."); In re Vasser, 75 N.J. 357, 361, 382 A.2d 1114, 1116 (1978) (judge must
uphold integrity and independence of judiciary and avoid appearance of impropriety); cf.
Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 544 (8th Cir.) (high standard of judicial performance
demanded ofjudges; four qualities required of every judge: (1) to hear courteously, (2) to
consider wisely, (3) to consider soberly, and (4) to decide impartially), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 976 (1972); United States v. Cruz, 455 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir.) (judge should be
exemplar of dignity and impartiality), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); MINN. R. BD.
JUDICIAL STANDARDS 4(a)(4), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 767-68 (1980) (judge may be disciplined for conduct prejudicial to administration of justice or conduct unbecoming judicial
officer).
10. See, e.g., In re Laster, 404 Mich. 449, 462, 274 N.W.2d 742, 746 (1979) (udge's
conduct fell short of standard expected of him); In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 184, 267
N.W.2d 914, 915 (1978) (conduct of judge was seriously unbecoming member of court); In
re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648, 692-97 (Minn. 1979) (activities violated Code of Judicial
Conduct), modified, 296 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1980); In re Bartholet, 293 Minn. 495, 500, 198
N.W.2d 152, 155 (1972) (particular acts under scrutiny showed lack of integrity and moral
character on part of judge); In re Cieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321, 332 (N.D. 1978) (judge's acts
were in contravention of judicial canons).
11. See, e.g., In re Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 710, 378 N.E.2d 669, 676 (1978) (judge's
actions created possibility that public would regard judge as subject to influence and did
not promote public confidence in judiciary); In re Laster, 404 Mich. 449, 459, 274 N.W.2d
742, 744 (1979) ("[pjublic confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges"); In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 195, 267 N.W.2d 914, 922
(1978) (conduct of judge could only have eroded public confidence in judiciary); In re
McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648, 697 (Minn. 1979) (conduct of judge can injure judicial
image), modifltd, 296 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1980); In re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 446, 252
N.W.2d 592, 594 (1977) (actions brought judicial office into disrepute).
12. See, e.g., In re Laster, 404 Mich. 449, 460, 274 N.W.2d 742, 745 (1979) (conduct
was clearly prejudicial to administration of justice); In re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 446,
252 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1977) (same); In re Heuermann, 90 S.D. 312, 319, 240 N.W.2d 603,
607 (1976) (same).
13. See In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 301, 245 S.E.2d 766, 772 (1978) (commission empowered to determine whether judge should be disciplined to maintain public confidence
in judicial system); cf In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648, 697 (Minn. 1979) (effective
functioning of judicial system depends upon citizens feeling they are provided fair treatment and just decisions; conduct that injures judicial image may be subject to discipline),
modifed, 296 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1980). Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers have
long been recognized as an effort by the court to protect the public. See, e.g. , In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1979); In re Streater, 262 Minn. 538, 543, 115 N.W.2d
729, 733 (1962).
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tice,14 and to maintain the integrity of the judicial system, 15 judges are
disciplined if they engage in inappropriate behavior.16
The purpose of this Note is to discuss and analyze Minnesota's judicial
disciplinary proceedings. First, the traditional methods of judicial discipline will be discussed.' 7 Second, Minnesota's judicial discipline procedures and their treatment by the Minnesota Supreme Court will be
discussed and analyzed.18 Third, various challenges to judicial disciplinary proceedings will be analyzed to determine whether Minnesota's
procedures will be able to overcome these potential challenges.19 Finally,
in an effort to provide greater protection of the rights of the individuals
involved and to improve the nature of the proceedings, changes in Min2
nesota's procedures will be proposed. o

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

The traditional methods of judicial discipline in the United States include address, impeachment, and recall.21 Because these heavily criti14. See Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 306, 308
(Ky. 1978) (purpose of disciplinary proceeding is to improve quality of justice administered); In re Cieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321, 326 (N.D. 1978) (aim of proceeding is to maintain
proper administration ofjustice); MINN. STAT. § 490.16(3) (1980) (judge may be removed
for conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).
15. Cf In re Bartholet, 293 Minn. 495, 499-500, 198 N.W.2d 152, 155 (1972) (judge
disciplined for lacking sense of fidelity owed by judges to public); In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d
369, 373 (Mo. 1978) (purpose of procedure is to maintain standards of judicial fitness); In
re Cieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321, 326 (N.D. 1978) (proceedings are to maintain honor and
dignity of judiciary).
16. See, e.g., In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979), modiAed, 296 N.W.2d
699 (Minn. 1980); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam); In re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 252 N.W.2d 592 (1977).
17. See notes 21-24, 51-53 infia and accompanying text.
18. See notes 54-200 in/a and accompanying text.
19. See notes 113-303 in~fa and accompanying text.
20. See notes 219-25, 232-34, 261, 306-07 ina and accompanying text.
21. See W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? 12 (1971); Comment, supra
note 1, at 564. Other early methods of discipline included executive action, defeat at
election, and bar association action. See Schoenbaum, A Historical Look atJuduial Discipline, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 1 (1977).
Address is a formal request from the legislature to the governor asking him to remove
a judge and is used when the judge's conduct does not warrant impeachment. See W.
BRAITHWAITE, supra, at 12; Cameron, The Inherent Power ofa State's Highest Court to Discipl'ne
theJud'ciag,54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 45, 45 n.3 (1977).
Impeachment is a criminal proceeding against a public official instituted by written
charges called "articles of impeachment." The lower house of the legislature acts as a
grand jury and the upper house sitting as a court tries the charges. Removal normally
requires a two-thirds vote. See W. BRAITHWAITE, supra, at 12; Schoenbaum, supra, at 5; cf.
MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("The house of representatives has the sole power of impeachment through a concurrence of a majority of all its members. All impeachments shall be
tried by the senate. When sitting for that purpose, senators shall be upon oath or affirmation to do justice according to law and evidence. No person shall be convicted without the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss2/4

4

et al.: Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings in Minnesota

19811

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

cized methods 22 have rarely been used, 23 they have failed to alleviate
most judicial misconduct.2 4 In response to that failure two new proceCourt on the Judiciary26 and
dures were developed by the states25-the
27
the Commission on Judicial Standards.
The Court on the Judiciary was established by New York in 1947,
solely to hear charges of misconduct against judges.28 Consisting of six
judges sitting as a result of their position on other courts, 29 the court was
convened by written request of certain authorities or by motion of the
chiefjudge of the court of appeals. 30 Once convened, hearings were conducted on the charges; for good cause the court could remove or retire
concurrence of two-thirds of the senators present."). For a discussion of the two cases of
impeachment in Minnesota, see note 51 in/a.
Recall is similar to initiative and referendum; the process begins by submission of a
petition that requests a recall proposition be placed on the ballot. The electorate then
votes for or against removal of the judge. See W. BRAITHWAITE, supra, at 12; Schoenbaum,
supra, at 8.
22. Impeachment and recall have been criticized as too time consuming, expensive,
and cumbersome. See Buckley, The Commission onJudz'ial Qwahftatims: An Attempt to Deal
with Judiaal Mi conduct, 3 U.S.F.L. REv. 244, 250 (1969), reprinted 6n G. WINTERS & R.
HANSON, supra note 2, at 60-74. Address and impeachment are ineffective methods of
discipline because of shortcomings in the legislative process. Legislators lack the ability to
undertake the role of judge and the legislative body lacks a method by which to screen and
investigate complaints or allegations against the judiciary. See Comment, supra note 1, at
366.
23. In the period from 1928 to 1948 only three impeachment proceedings were instituted against judges of the appellate and trial courts. The judges prevailed in all three
prosecutions. See Miller, Discipline ofJudges, 50 MICH. L. REV. 737, 737 (1952). Research
by one commentator failed to uncover any instances of address or recall in the three decades preceding 1971. See W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 13.
24. See Comment, supra note 1, at 566-67 (judicial misconduct and disability have
been left unsolved by traditional procedures of discipline); cf.W. BRAITHWArrE, supra note
21, at 12 (evidence on effectiveness of traditional procedures of discipline is scant); Brand,
The Disczpline ofJudges, 46 A.B.AJ. 1315, 1316 (1960) (impeachment and address are inadequate methods of discipline).
25. See Schoenbaum, supra note 21, at 23 (present methods developed because of dissatisfaction with earlier ineffective methods ofjudicial discipline); Comment, supra note 1,
at 566-67 ("The emergence of new plans in recent years may be viewed as a reflection of
an increased awareness of the need for workable machinery to deal with the problems...
left unsolved by the traditional procedures.").
26. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37; OKLA. CONST. art. VII-A, § 1.
27. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30 (Judicial Tenure
Commission).
28. See N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 9-a (1947, repealed 1962).
29. See id. § 22(b) (1961, repealed 1977) ("court on the judiciary shall be composed of
the chief judge of the court of appeals, the senior associate judge of the court of appeals,
and one justice of the appellate division of the supreme court in each judicial department'). There are four judicial departments of the appellate division of the supreme
court.
30. See id. § 22(d) (1961, repealed 1977) (authorities who could convene court by written request were governor, presiding justice of appellate division of supreme court, or majority of executive committee of New York State Bar Association).
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the particular judge involved.31
32
Unfortunately, New York's Court on the Judiciary was a rarely used
and ineffective disciplinary procedure. 33 The court's failure is attributable to a number of factors. First, there was no permanent staff to receive
and investigate complaints.34 Second, the proceedings lacked confidentiality,35 were cumbersome, and were time consuming. 36 Finally, in those
situations in which removal or retirement was not warranted, the court
was powerless to act because no other disciplinary sanctions existed. 37 In
an effort to correct this problem, New York and the three other jurisdictions that initially adopted this approach 38 have either supplemented or
replaced their Court on the Judiciary with a Commission on Judicial
39
Standards or Qualifications.
31. See id. § 22(a) (1961, repealed 1977). Although removal and retirement were the
only two methods of discipline, the Court on the Judiciary could disqualify the judge from
holding any public office in the state. See id. § 22(b) (1961, repealed 1977). The court had
the power to remove or retire any judge of the court of appeals, justice of the supreme
court,judge of the court of claims,judge of the county court,judge of the surrogate's court
or judge of the family court. See id. § 22(a) (1961, repealed 1977). A judge could be
removed or retired by the concurrence of four or more members of the court. See id.
§ 22(c) (1961, repealed 1977).
32. See I. TESITOR, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (1973) (court convened
twice during its first 18 years); Frankel, Removal ofjudges. California Tackles an Old toblem,
49 A.B.A.J. 166, 167 (1963) (although created in 1947, Court on Judiciary first met in
1959); Note, Remedesforjudical Misconduct and Disability. Removal and Discipline ofjudges, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 149, 185 (1966).
33. Cf. Stern, New York's Approach toJudicialDircipihe." The Development of a Commission
System, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 137, 138 (1977) (system did not achieve its goals); Comment, supra note 1, at 568 (California system has received more widespread approval than
New York system).
34. See W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 66; Stern, supra note 33, at 139 (there was
no staff exclusively assigned to monitor judiciary, identify problem areas or commence
investigation in absence of complaint); Note, supra note 32, at 185.
35. See W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 66; I. TESITOR, supra note 32, at 1 ("court
lacked an appropriate confidential mechanism for screening complaints and investigating
alleged misconduct"); Note, supra note 32, at 190; cf. Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley,
JudicialRemoval in New York. A New Look, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 23 (1971) (judge under
investigation may suffer from adverse publicity).
36. Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, supra note 35, at 23.
37. See W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 67; I. TESITOR, supra note 32, at 1-2.
Despite the criticisms directed at the New York Court on the Judiciary, the system was
considered an improvement over the more traditional methods of judicial discipline. See
W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 65; Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, supra note 35, at
23; Comment, supra note 1, at 568.
38. Delaware, Illinois, and Oklahoma also initially adopted the system of a Court on
the Judiciary, but have since established Commissions on Judicial Standards or Qualifications. See I. TESITOR, supra note 32, at 2.
39. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22; Greenberg, The Illinois "Two- Tier"JudicialDisciphnay System." Five Years and Counting, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 69, 69; cf.I. TESITOR, supra note
32, at 2 (other states which began with special court procedure have now added investigatory bodies to screen complaints before court hears them). For a general discussion of New
York's Court on the Judiciary, see W. BRAITHWArrE, supra note 21, at 56-67; Gasperini,
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In 1960, California became the first state to create a Commission on
Judicial Qualifications. 40 The Commission4l investigates complaints
filed against California judges.42 If the preliminary investigation indicates there is good cause for discipline, the judge may be admonished
privately or formal disciplinary proceedings may be instituted.43 After
formal proceedings are completed, the California Supreme Court, upon
recommendation of the Commission, may censure, remove, or retire the
44
judge under investigation.
The California system has proven effective. 45 The system is capable of
handling a large number of complaints and eliminating unwarranted
complaints at the initial stage. 46 An independent staff aids the CommisAnderson & McGinley, supra note 35. For a discussion of the present Illinois system, see
Greenberg, supra. For a general discussion of the beginning of the Oklahoma system, see
Hays, An Oklahoma View. The Dzscipline and Removal ofJudges, 50 JUDICATURE 64 (1966),
reprintedin G. WINTERS & R. HANSON, SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND
REMOVAL 95-97 (G. Winters ed. 1973).
40. See Schoenbaum, supra note 21, at 20 & n.112. The Commission was created by
constitutional amendment in 1960. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1(b) (1960, repealed 1966).
The Commission has been renamed the Commission on Judicial Performance. The Commission's constitutional authority is now codified at article six, sections eight and eighteen,
of the California Constitution.
41. The Commission is composed of
2 judges of courts of appeal, 2 judges of superior courts, and one judge of a
municipal court, each appointed by the Supreme Court; 2 members of the State
Bar who have practiced law in this State for 10 years, appointed by its governing
body; and 2 citizens who are not judges, retired judges, or members of the State
Bar, appointed by the Governor . . . and approved by [a majority of] the
Senate.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
42. The Commission has the authority to make a preliminary inquiry upon receipt of
a verified statement, not obviously unfounded or frivolous, alleging facts indicating that a judge is guilty of wilful misconduct in office, persistent failure or inability to perform his duties, habitual intemperance in the use of intoxicants or
drugs, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or that he has a disability that seriously interferes with
the performance of his duties and is or is likely to become permanent, or that he
has engaged in an improper action or a dereliction of duty ....
CAL. R. CT. 904(a).
43. Id. 904(d). Private admonishment is the only disciplinary sanction the Commission possesses and this action is subject to review by the California Supreme Court. See
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c); CAL. R. CT. 904(d).
44. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c); CAL. R. CT. 919(a)-(d). The recommendations
must be certified by the Commission's chairman or secretary and are filed with the clerk of
the supreme court. See id. 919(a). When the Commission's recommendation involves a
judge of the supreme court, the recommendations are reviewed by a tribunal of judges
from the court of appeals, selected by lot. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(e); CAL. R. CT.
92 1(a).
45. See W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 93-94; cf. Frankel, supra note 32, at 170
(Commission in its first two years of operation considered 163 matters, resulting in removal or resignation of 10 judges).
46. See Frankel, supra note 32, at 170 ("[u]nwarranted complaints and groundless
charges are closed at the initial stage"); cf. Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, supra note
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sion in screening and evaluating complaints and thus ensures an objective determination on the merits. 4 7 Cases of misconduct are handled
expeditiously, confidentially, and economically.48 The Commission has
had a noticeable effect in improving judicial behavior and deterring judicial misconduct. 49 As a result, the California system has become the
50
model for judicial disciplinary bodies in a majority of states.
III.

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN MINNESOTA

Historically, impeachment 5 1 and executive removal52 were the only
35, at 30 (over half of complaints are found to be unwarranted or beyond jurisdiction of
Commission, other complaints apparently valid but of little significance may be disposed
of if satisfactorily explained by judge).
47. See W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 94.
48. See id. at 93-94; Buckley, supra note 22, at 255 (proceedings are confidential until
recommendation of discipline is made to supreme court); Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, supra note 35, at 31 (confidentiality is one of foundations of California's system).
49. See Buckley, supra note 22, at 257; Frankel, supra note 32, at 171; Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, supra note 35, at 31-32; Comment, supra note 1, at 570. For a more
critical view of the California system, see Note, JudiialDisciplinein California.- A Critical
Re-Evaluation, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 192 (1976).
50. See I. TESITOR, supra note 32, at 2-4, 10-14 (Table); Gillis & Fieldman, Michigan's
Unitay System ofJudial Discipline: A Comparison with Illinois' Two- Tier Approach, 54 Cm.KENT L. REV. 117, 117 (1977) (46 states have followed California's lead in formulating
new administrative systems to deal more effectively with problem of judicial misconduct
and incompetence); Schoenbaum, supra note 21, at 21. Some states have made innovations on the California system and have adopted a two-tiered approach to judicial disci-pline. Under the two-tiered approach the commission receives and investigates
complaints and when probable cause for the complaint is found by the commission the
charges are presented to a separate board or court for adjudication. Approximately eight
states have adopted such an approach. See I. TESITOR, supra note 32, at 2. For a discussion of one state's two-tiered system, see Greenberg, The llinois "Two-Tier"JudcialDtscplinay System.- Five Years and Counting, supra note 39.
51. MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 provides that "[tihe house of representatives has the
sole power of impeachment through a concurrence of a majority of all its members. All
impeachments shall be tried by the senate."
The "judges of the supreme and district courts may be impeached for corrupt conduct in office or for crimes and misdemeanors." Id. § 2. No officer may exercise the duties
of his office after he has been impeached and before his acquittal. Id. § 3.
In Minnesota there have been at least two instances in which a judge has been impeached by the house and tried by the senate. Judge Sherman Page of the tenth judicial
district was impeached by the Minnesota House of Representatives on March 4, 1878. See
MINN. H.R. JOUR. 577-84 (1878). The charges that formed the basis of impeachment
were based on petitions submitted to the house by the county auditor and other individuals. See id. at 54, 577-84. The county auditor's petition stated Judge Page's character was
"incompatible with the dignity and sacredness of the high position to which he had been
called" and many of his official acts were "improper, disreputable and illegal." See id. at
577. After an investigation by its judiciary committee, the house charged Judge Page with
10 articles of impeachment. See id. at 91, 97, 558-72.
The senate then tried the case over the course of more than 25 days. See generally
JOUR. OF THE S. OF MINN. SITTING AS A HIGH COURT OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE TRIAL
OF HON. SHERMAN PAGE, JUDGE OF THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 20th Sess. (1878).
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ways to discipline judges in Minnesota. Unfortunately these traditional
Over 75 witnesses were subpoenaed to appear at the proceedings. See id. vol. 1, at 160-61.
The record of the proceedings totalled over 1400 pages. On the final day of the trial, June
28, 1878, a vote was taken by the senate on each article of impeachment. Judge Page was
acquitted of every charge. See id. vol. 3, at 365-70. The impeachment trial apparently was
viewed with disdain by some Minnesotans since one person was prompted to write a short
satirical play on the impeachment trial. Seegeneralo/P. SIMMONS, THE HIGH OLD COURT
OF IMPEACHMENT-OR-"As GOOD AS A PLAY" IN THREE ACTS (0. Dodge ed. 1878).
P.E.R. Simmons was a pseudonym of the author, Dewitt Clinton Cooley. See id.
Three years later a second Minnesota judge, the Honorable E. St. Julien Cox, was
impeached by a vote of 78 to 13. MINN. H.R. JOUR. 264 (1881). Judge Cox had been
under investigation by the house as early as 1878, based on an allegation in the St. Paul
Pioneer Press that he had been intoxicated while presiding at court in Fairmont, Minnesota. See id. at 207 (1878).
Judge Cox was charged with 20 articles of impeachment. See id. at 256-64 (1881).
Articles I through XVII charged that the judge had tried cases while intoxicated. See id.
at 256-63. Article XVIII accused the judge of habitual drunkenness; articles XIX and XX
claimed that the judge had on at least two occasions demeaned himself and brought the
judicial office into disrepute by cavorting with and frequenting the company of prostitutes. See id. at 263-64.
The trial began in early January of 1882 and ended on March 22, 1882. See generally
JOUR. OF THE S. OF MINN. SITTING AS A HIGH COURT OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE TRIAL
OF HON. E. ST. JULIEN COX, JUDGE OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 22d Sess. (18811882). The trial produced a record of over 3,000 pages. Six of the articles were dismissed
including the two involving claims of association with prostitutes. See id. vol. 1, at 100204. Judge Cox was acquitted of seven other articles. See id. vol. 3, at 2913-62. Judge Cox
was, however, convicted on seven counts of intoxication while presiding on the bench. See
id. vol. 3, at 2985-88. Upon Judge Cox's conviction the senate disqualified the judge from
holding any judicial office in the state for a period of three years. See id. vol. 3, at 2989.
52. MINN. STAT. § 351.03 (1980) provides in part: "The governor may remove from
office any . . . judge of probate, judge of any municipal court, [or] justice of the peace
• . . when it appears to him by competent evidence, that either has been guilty of malfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance of his official duties." The rules of the Board on
Judicial Standards, however, provide that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over fulltime judges. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 2(c), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 767 (1980).
State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, 141 Minn. 308, 170 N.W. 201 (1918), is the only reported
decision in which the Governor exercised his power to remove a judge from the bench.
Plaintiff was a probate judge who because of his continued and vocal opposition to the
United States' entry into World War I and his professed sympathy with the cause of Germany was removed from office by defendant-Governor. The statute authorizing the Governor's action was substantially similar to the present statute and allowed the Governor to
remove a judge when it appeared that he had been guilty of nonfeasance or malfeasance.
Id. at 319-20, 170 N.W. at 202.
The court ruled that the removal proceedings were clearly improper. Id. at 321-22,
170 N.W. at 203. The court stated that "[t]he misconduct or malfeasance under our law
must have direct relation to and be connected with the 'performance of official duties,'
and amount either to maladministration, or to willful and intentional neglect and failure
to discharge the duties of the office at all." Id. at 322, 170 N.W. at 203. The court vacated
the order of the Governor removing the judge from office. Id. at 323, 170 N.W. at 203.
There is one other instance of executive removal in Minnesota's history. The first
supreme court justice of the Minnesota territory, Aaron Goodrich, was removed from office by President Fillmore. See United States ex re. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 284, 301 (1854); Voight, Aaron Goodrzch." Stormy Petrelof the Terr'ton'alBench, 39 MIN-
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methods were ineffective and rarely used. 53 In 1971, the Minnesota Legislature, following California's lead, created the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards.54 The creation of the Board has rendered the
traditional methods of judicial discipline obsolete. 55
A.

Powers and Procedures of the Board on Judicial Standards

The Board is composed of nine members-three judges, two lawyers,
and four laypersons.56 All of the Board's members are appointed by the
Governor, subject to senate approval.57 Each member is appointed to a
four-year term and no person may serve more than two terms. 58 The
Apparently the removal of the judge was motivated by political considerations. Id. at 148-51.
Minnesota has considered at least one other method of judicial discipline. In 1913,
the state legislature passed a bill that proposed amending the constitution to provide for a
recall of public officers by the voters of the state or of the electoral district for which the
officer was elected. See Act of Apr. 16, 1913, ch. 593, 1913 Minn. Laws 102. The act
provided that the proposed amendment to the constitution be submitted to the voters of
the state at the next general election. Id. at 902-03. The proposed amendment was
rejected.
53. There are only five instances of disciplinary action against judges in Minnesota's
history prior to the creation of the Board on Judicial Standards. See In re Bartholet, 293
Minn. 495, 198 N.W.2d 152 (1972); notes 51-52 supra.
54. Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 909, §§ 1-4, 1971 Minn. Laws 1862, 1862 (current version
at MINN. STAT. §§ 490.15-.16 (1980)); Act of May 11, 1973, ch. 214, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws
417, 417 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 490.18 (1980)).
55. Since the Board's creation in 1971, there have been no instances of impeachment
or executive removal. Six judges, however, have been removed, suspended, fined, or censured by the supreme court following a formal investigation and report by the Board. See
In re Roberts, Finance and Commerce, Jan. 23, 1981, at 2, col. 2 (Minn. Jan. 20, 1981); In
re Mann, No. 50982 (Minn. Mar. 5, 1980); In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn.
1979), modified, 296 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1980); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978)
(per curiam); In re Sandeen, No. 48183 (Minn. Oct. 27, 1977); In re Anderson, 312 Minn.
442, 252 N.W.2d 592 (1977). The Board also has investigated a number of other complaints and when appropriate taken some form of action. Se notes 106-07 infra and accompanying text.
56. See MINN. STAT. § 490.15(1) (1980) (Board "consists of one judge of the district
court, one judge of a municipal court, one judge of a county court, two lawyers who have
practiced law in the state for ten years and four citizens who are not judges, retired judges
or lawyers").
57. See id. Alternate members who substitute for disqualified or absent members are
selected and appointed in the same manner as regular members. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL
STANDARDS l(b), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 766 (1980).
The current rules of the Board on Judicial Standards are based in substantial part on
the ABA Standards. See Interview with George J. Kurvers, Executive Secretary of the
Board on Judicial Standards (Apr. 3, 1981) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review
office). Compare MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 8(d), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 770 (1980)
with ABA JOINT COMMrITEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS RELATING To
NESOTA HISTORY 141, 151 (1964-1965).

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY RETIREMENTS §§ 5.4-.7 (Approved Draft 1978)
[hereinafter cited as STANDARDS RELATING To JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE].
58. See MINN. STAT. § 490.15(l) (1980); MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 1(c), 9
MINN. STAT.

765, 766 (1980). "A member selected to serve the remainder of an unexpired
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Board has an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the Board.59 The
Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct of "anyone exercising
judicial powers and performing judicial functions, including judges assigned to administrative duties within the judicial branch."60 Grounds
for discipline include: a felony conviction; willful misconduct in office;
willful misconduct unrelated to judicial duties that brings the judicial
office into disrepute; conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice or unbecoming a judicial officer; and conduct that violates the
codes of judicial conduct or professional responsibility. 6 1
term shall not be considered to have served the equivalent of a full four-year term for
purposes of this section." Id. 1(c)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. at 766.
59. See MINN. STAT. § 490.15(1) (1980); MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 1(a), 9
MINN. STAT. 765, 765 (1980). The executive secretary's term of office is not limited by
statute or by the Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards.
60. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 2(b), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 767 (1980); cf.
MINN. STAT. § 490.18 (1980) (provisions establishing Board on Judicial Standards apply
to "all judges, judicial officers, referees and justices of the peace").
The Board has exclusive jurisdiction over full-time judges and the conduct of parttime judges acting in a judicial capacity. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 2(c), 9
MINN. STAT. 765, 767 (1980). Jurisdiction over full-time judges "shall include conduct
that occurred prior to a judge assuming judicial office." Id.
61. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 4(a)(l)-(5), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 767-68
(1980); cf. MINN. STAT. § 490.16(3) (1980) ("[o]n recommendation of the board on judicial
standards, the supreme court may . . . censure or remove a judge for action or inaction
that may constitute persistent failure to perform his duties, incompetence in performing
his duties, habitual intemperance or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice").
One judge has been disciplined for violation of the judicial code. See In re Anderson, 312
Minn. 442, 447-49, 252 N.W.2d 592, 594-95 (1977).
If the judge's conduct is such that he is charged with a serious crime, he may be
suspended immediately without the necessity of Board action. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL
STANDARDS 7(a), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769 (1980) (judge suspended with pay immediately
upon filing of indictment of information charging him with felony under state or federal
law); id. 7(b), 9 MINN. STAT. at 769 (conduct resulting in misdemeanor charges may be
grounds for immediate suspension with pay by supreme court if conduct adversely affects
his ability to perform duties of office). The favorable or unfavorable disposition of criminal charges does not affect the ability of the Board to bring disciplinary charges against
the judge. See id. 7(a)-(b), 9 MINN. STAT. at 769. For a discussion of the constitutionality
of interim suspension, see notes 235-44 bnfia and accompanying text.
The Board also has the authority to investigate allegations that a judge is physically
or mentally disabled. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 2(a), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 767
(1980); cf. MINN. STAT. § 490.16(3) (1980) ("[o]n recommendation of the board on judicial
standards, the supreme court may retire a judge for disability that seriously interferes with
the performance of his duties and is or is likely to become permanent").
The Board also has the authority to investigate complaints concerning a judge's compliance with Minnesota Statutes section 546.27. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS
2(a)(4), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 767 (1980). This statute states in part:
All questions of fact and law, and all motions and matters submitted to a judge
for his decision, shall be disposed of and his decision filed with the clerk within
90 days after such submission, unless sickness or casualty shall prevent, or the
time be extended by written consent of the parties.
MINN. STAT. § 546.27(1) (1980). The Board is required to review annually the compli-

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

1. Informal Investigation
An inquiry into the propriety of a particular judge's conduct may be
instituted by the Board itself 62 or at the request of a member of the general public. 63 The Executive Secretary of the Board conducts the initial
investigation 64 and determines whether the complaint should be
presented to the Board or dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. 6 5 In
practice, however, the results of such investigation always are submitted
66
to the Board for its consideration.
The Board is not required to notify the judge that a complaint has
been filed against him. Unless the judge is notified within ninety days
following receipt of the complaint no disciplinary action may be taken as
a result of the complaint and the complaint may not be used against the
67
judge in a disciplinary proceeding.
The Board's initial responsibility is to determine whether the Executive Secretary's investigation establishes probable cause to proceed. 68 If
ance of each district, county, municipal, and probate judge with this provision. Id.

§ 546.27(2).
One judge has been suspended for failure to comply with this requirement, as well as
for other acts of misconduct. See In re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 445-49, 252 N.W.2d 592,
593-95 (1977).
62. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 6(a)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 768 (1980)
("board may on its own motion make inquiry with respect to whether a judge is guilty of
misconduct"). In the McDonough decision, a claim was made that the Board was without
proper authorization because there was no sworn grievance or motion of the Board initiating the investigation. The court considered this violation only technical because a complaint was filed and a consensus of the Board was in favor of the investigation. In re
McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648, 688 (Minn. 1979), modifed, 296 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1980).
63. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 6(a)(l), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 768 (1980)
(inquiry "may be initiated upon any reasonable basis, including oral or written complaints made by judges, lawyers, court personnel, or members of the general public").
64. See id. l(e)(4), 9 MINN. STAT. at 766; id. 6(c)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. at 769.
65. Id. 6(c)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. at 769.
66. Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 1; cf.MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL
STANDARDS 6(e)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769 (1980) ("board shall promptly consider the
results of an investigation and evaluation conducted by the executive secretary").
67.

MINN. R.

BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS

6(d), 9 MINN. STAT. 765,

769 (1980)

provides:
(1) Notice that a complaint has been made may be given to the judge named in
the complaint.
(2) No action shall be taken on any complaint in which the judge is not notified within 90 days after the receipt of such complaint, and if not notified the
complaint cannot be used against the judge.
Id.
The rules are unclear on the applicability of subdivision 2 when the investigation is
initiated by the Board itself rather than the result of a complaint by a member of the
general public. Arguably, the 90-day period would begin to run on the date the executive
secretary is authorized to investigate the conduct of the judge.
68. Probable cause is not defined by the rules. One jurisdiction has indicated the
term requires the judicial disciplinary body "to determine to a reasonable certainty the
probability that a violation of the Judicial Code of Ethics has been committed and the
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probable cause is not found, the Board may issue a private reprimand,69
or, by informal adjustment, inform the judge that his conduct is or may
be the cause for discipline, 70 direct the judge to seek professional counseling or assistance, 71 or impose conditions on the judge's conduct. 7 2 If, on
the other hand, probable cause does exist, the Board conducts a formal
investigation."7
probability that the judge under investigation has committed it." In re Van Susteren, 82
Wis. 2d 307, 311-12, 262 N.W.2d 133, 136 (1978).
MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 6(e)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769 (1980) requires

that a majority of the full Board concur in a finding of probable cause.
69.

MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 6(g)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769 (1980).

70. Id. 6(g)(2)(i), 9 MINN. STAT, at 769.
71. Id. 6(g)(2)(ii), 9 MINN. STAT. at 769.
72. Id. 6(g)(2)(iii), 9 MINN. STAT. at 769.
Rule 6(g) has an analogous provision in the ABA Standards. Compare id. 6(g), 9
MINN. STAT. at 769 with STANDARDS RELATING To JUDICIAL DIscIPLINE, supra note 57,

§ 6.6.
Both rules grant a wide scope of discretion that allows the Board to impose conditions
on the judge's conduct without review, unless the judge decides to appeal the decision and
make the matter public. See Todd & Proctor, Burden of Proof,Sanctions, and Confdentiality, 54
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 177, 185 (1977).
The Commentary to Rule 6.6 gives the following justification for the rule:
Occasionally a judge will be guilty of misconduct through inadvertence or a
lack of understanding as to the high ethical demands of the code of judicial
conduct. Sometimes the fact that the commission has brought a judge's behavior
to his attention will be sufficient to induce him to avoid such conduct in the
future.
Occasionally the conduct complained of is of an involuntary nature . . .
and the judge may need professional counseling or other assistance in order to
regain effective control over his behavior. On other occasions, further guidance
in how to carry out his judicial duties more effectively may be called for.
The commission may recommend that the judge avoid certain conduct that
appears to be questionable. If, for example, the judge is having a drinking problem the commission may impose a condition that the judge attend an alcohol
treatment program, or that he refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages during
the day, or altogether.
When an informal adjustment or private reprimand is used, it should be
conditioned upon the judge acknowledging that he is aware that he is waiving
his right to a hearing. The informal adjustment or private reprimand should not
serve as a bar to further proceedings based on similar misconduct or conduct of a
different nature that together with the prior conduct would have a negative cumulative effect upon the judge's integrity or the appearance of fair and impartial
behavior. By consenting to the informal adjustment or private reprimand the
judge is making a knowing waiver of his right to object to the findings that are
the basis for this disposition being used against him at a subsequent hearing and
in subsequent impositions of discipline. The judge should be fully advised by the
commission that the result of the acceptance of private dispositions is the waiving of these rights. Therefore, the judge should be required to accept an informal adjustment or private reprimand in writing.
STANDARDS RELATING To JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 57, § 6.6, Commentary.
73. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 6(e)(1), 8, 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769, 770
(1980). The confidential nature of the proceedings ceases when there has been a "determination of probable cause and formal charges have been filed." Id. 5(a)(1), 9 MINN. STAT.
at 768.
For a discussion of the purpose of the rule on confidentiality, see Peskoe, ProceduresFor
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FormalProceedings

When sufficient cause to proceed exists, the complainant74 files a
sworn complaint 75 that is served upon the judge. 76 The judge must respond to the complaint in writing within twenty days. 77 If, after reviewing the judge's response, the Board decides to continue the proceeding 78
79
it files formal charges against the judge with the Executive Secretary.
After formal charges have been filed, a public hearing is scheduled. 80
The judge is served with the formal charges and must respond to them in
writing within twenty days. 8 ' Generally, the date selected for the hear82
ing is within thirty days following receipt of the judge's response.
JudiCial Discipline." ype Of Commission, Due Process & Right To Counsel, 54 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 147, 160-62 (1977).
74. The initial complainant may be a judge, a lawyer, court personnel, the Board
itself, or a member of the general public. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 6(a)(1)-(2),
9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769 (1980). The rules are unclear regarding the process when the
investigation is initiated by the Board. The executive secretary, apparently at the Board's
direction, prepares a statement of allegations. See Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra
note 57, at 2.
75. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 8(a)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 770 (1980). If a
sworn complaint is not obtained, a statement of the allegations and the facts must be
prepared by the executive secretary. Id. "Where more than one act of misconduct is
alleged, each shall be clearly set forth." Id.
76. Id. 8(a)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. at 770. Service must be in accordance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id.
77. Id. 8(a)(3), 9 MINN. STAT. at 770. In lieu of or in addition to this written response, the judge may make a personal appearance. Id. If the judge appears personally
his statement is recorded. Id.
78. At this point in the proceeding or anytime thereafter, the Board may terminate
the proceedings and give notice to all complainants and the judge that the Board has
found insufficient cause to proceed. Id. 8(b), 9 MINN. STAT. at 770. Unlike the situation
in which a similar determination is made following the Board's consideration of the executive secretary's investigation, there does not appear to be any sanctions that the Board
may impose on the judge at this stage of the proceeding. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
79. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 8(C)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 770 (1980).
Confidentiality ceases upon filing of the statement. Id.
Generally, all proceedings are confidential until there has been a determination of
probable cause and formal charges filed. Id. 5(a), 9 MINN. STAT. at 768. If the inquiry
was initiated as a result of notoriety or conduct that is of public record, however, information regarding the lack of cause to proceed shall be released by the Board. Id. 6(0(3), 9
MINN. STAT. at 769.
80. Id. 8(d)(l), 9 MINN. STAT. at 770. "The judge and all counsel shall be notified of
the time and place of the hearing." Id.
81. See id. 8(c)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. at 770.
82. See id. 8(d)(l), 9 MINN. STAT. at 770 (after filing formal charges Board shall
schedule public hearing, date selected shall afford judge ample time to prepare for hearing
but shall not be later than 30 days following receipt of judge's response). In "extraordinary circumstances," however, the Board may extend the hearing date. Id. 8(d)(2), 9
MINN. STAT. at 770. The rules do not define the term "extraordinary circumstances."
The judge and the Board are entitled to discovery to the extent available in civil or
criminal proceedings, whichever is broader. Id. 8(d)(3), 9 MINN. STAT. at 770. The civil
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The formal hearing, which is open to the public, is presided over by
the entire Board, a three-member panel of the Board, or a referee.83 The
Board's attorney presents the matter to the presiding authority8 4 and has
8
the burden of proving the charges by clear and convincing evidence. 5
The judge or his counsel is allowed to present and cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence.86
Following the conclusion of the proceedings, the presiding authority
87
makes findings and recommendations which, together with the record
88
and transcript of the testimony, are submitted to the entire Board. The
Board then promptly reviews the findings and conclusions and the record, 89 as well as any objections that may have been raised. 9° Following
this review, the Board determines whether to recommend discipline of
thejudge. 9 1 If a majority favors discipline, this recommendation, 92 along
with the record and findings, are filed with the Minnesota Supreme
Court for final review. 93 Once the recommendation is filed, the matter is
rules are broader. Compare MINN. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 9 MINN. STAT. 202-18 (1980) with
MINN. R. GRIM. P. 9, 21, 9 MINN. STAT. 52-56, 84-87 (1980).
83. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 9(a)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 771 (1980). If
the Board directs the hearing be before a referee appointed by the supreme court the
Board must file a written request with the court. The supreme court appoints a referee
within 10 days of receipt of this request. Id. 9(a)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771. The person
designated to preside at the hearing must be either a judge or a lawyer. Id. 9(a)(3), 9
MINN. STAT. at 771.
84. Id. 9(c)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771. When a Board attorney presents evidence to
members of the Board sitting as factfinders, there is a potential conflict of interest between
these "prosecutorial" and "factfinding" roles that taints the fairness of the proceedings. But
see notes 205-14 infra and accompanying text.
85. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 9(c)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 771 (1980).
86. Id. 9(c)(3), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771. All witnesses receive fees and expenses to the
extent allowable in ordinary civil actions. Generally witnesses' expenses are borne by the
party calling them. Id. I l(a)(l)-(2), 9 MINN. STAT. at 772.
87. Every formal hearing is recorded verbatim. Id. 9(c)(4), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771.
88. Id. 10(a), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771. These materials are also provided to the judge
under investigation. Id. The attorneys for the Board and the judge may submit objections
to the findings and recommendations. Id. 10(b), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771.
89. Id. 10(c), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771.
90. While the rules do not explicitly provide that the objections become part of the
record, it can be inferred that because the objections are permitted under the rules, they
become part of the record and are reviewed by the Board in making its recommendation.
91. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 10(e)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 771 (1980)
(Board recommends discipline if majority of all members concur). In making its decision
the Board may substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. See id. 10(c), 9 MINN.
STAT. at 771.
92. If there is a dissenting opinion it is transmitted to the supreme court along with
the majority's decision. Id. 10(e)(3), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771.
93. See id. 12(a), 9 MINN. STAT. at 772. Proof of service must also be filed. Id.
The recommendation to the supreme court may be any of the following sanctions:
(1) Removal;
(2) Retirement;
(3) Imposing discipline as an attorney;
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docketed for expedited consideration 94 and the parties must file briefs
with the Minnesota Supreme Court. 95
3.

Minnesota Supreme Court Review

The supreme court then examines the record 96 of the earlier proceedings, and issues a written opinion detailing what disciplinary action, if
any, it deems just and proper.9 7 The court has full discretion in the matter-it may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Board. 98 When the court contemplates removal of a judge
(4) Imposing limitations or conditions on the performance of judicial duties;
(5) Reprimand or censure;
(6) Imposing a fine;
(7) Assessment of costs and expenses;
(8) Any combination of the above sanctions.
Id. 10(d), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771.
In the event a judge refuses to retire voluntarily, he may be involuntarily retired by
the supreme court. If attempts to convince a judge to retire voluntarily fail, then the
Board must file a formal complaint, hold a public hearing, make findings of fact, and
present recommendations to the supreme court. Id. 14(a), 9 MINN. STAT. at 773.
A judge who is involuntarily retired is ineligible to perform judicial duties pending
further order of the court and the court may indefinitely suspend him from the practice of
law or transfer him to inactive status. Id. 14(b), 9 MINN. STAT. at 773.

94. Id. 12(b), 9 MINN.
95. Id. 12(c), 9 MINN.

STAT,

at 772.

STAT. at 772.

96. If the court finds the record deficient in any respect, special procedures exist for
supplementing the record or obtaining additional findings. The court may remand the
matter to the Board, retaining jurisdiction, and stay the proceeding pending receipt of the
Board's filing of the additional record. See id. 12(d)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. at 772. The court
may order additional findings or oral argument on a particular issue on the entire record.
Id. 12(d)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. at 772. The court without remand and prior to imposing
discipline may accept or solicit supplementary filings provided the parties have notice and
an opportunity to be heard. Id. 12(d)(3), 9 MINN. STAT. at 772.
97. Id. 12(f), 9 MINN. STAT. at 772. A charge filed against a member of the supreme
court shall be heard and submitted to the court in the same manner as charges against
other judges except that members of the supreme court may disqualify themselves under
Minnesota Statutes section 2.724, subdivision 2. See id. 12(h), 9 MINN. STAT. at 773. Disqualified justices are replaced in the following manner: "Any number of justices may
disqualify themselves from hearing and considering a case, in which event the supreme
court may assign temporarily a retired justice of the supreme court or a district court
judge to hear and consider the case in place of each disqualified justice." MINN. STAT.
§ 2.724(2) (1980).
The respondent may file a motion for rehearing depending upon the posture taken by
the court. Cf. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 12(i), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 773 (1980)
(supreme court may direct no motion for rehearing will be entertained, in which event its
decision becomes final upon its filing). If the court does not prohibit a rehearing, respondent may present a rehearing motion within 15 days after filing of the decision. See id.
98. See id. 12(), 9 MINN. STAT. at 772 (court shall direct "such disciplinary action as
it finds just and proper, accepting, rejecting, or modifying in whole or in part, the recommendations of the board"). Furthermore, the supreme court has indicated "the grant of
absolute power to remove from office implicitly gives us the power to impose lesser sanctions short of removal, in the absence of specific indication to the contrary by the legislature." In re Anderson, 312 Minn. 442, 448, 252 N.W.2d 592, 595 (1977).
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from the bench, it also may determine that discipline of the judge as a
lawyer may be warranted. 99 If a judge is to be removed, the court may
provide the judge and the Lawyer's Professional Responsibility Board an
opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether to discipline the judge as
an attorney. 100
.

D'cipinagy Action by the Board

From 1972 through 198010, the Board has received 503 complaints.102
The sources of the complaints include litigants, attorneys, law enforcement officials, judges, and other third parties.103 The complaints have
ranged from poor judicial temperament, to alcoholism, to practicing law
while on the bench.104 The complaints investigated and closed by the
Board in 1978, 1979, and 1980 concerned the following:105
64
Dissatisfaction with Decision ................................
33
Personal Behavior ..........................................
31
Slow in Orders .............................................
Procedural or Administrative
31
Irregularity ..............................................
23
Bias or Prejudice ...........................................
8
Conflict of Interest .........................................
Attorney Misconduct-Prior to
7
Becom ing a Judge ........................................
99. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 12(g), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 772 (1980).

100. See id. ("If removal of a judge is deemed appropriate by the court, it shall notify
the judge and the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board and give them an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the lawyers [sz: discipline, if any, to be imposed.").
101. The executive secretary is required by the rules to prepare an annual report of the
Board's activities that may be made public by a majority vote of the Board. See id.
l(e)(10), 9 MINN. STAT. at 776 (duty of executive secretary to prepare annual report of
Board activities); id 1(h), 9 MINN. STAT. at 767 (copies of annual report may be made
available by majority vote of full Board). There are no reports for 1972 and 1973.
102. See MINNESOTA BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS, ANNUAL REPORT: MINNESOTA BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1980, at 3-4 (Apr. 2,

1981) (number of complaints received were 4 in 1972, 35 in 1973, 54 in 1974, 41 in 1975,
53 in 1976, 73 in 1977, 71 in 1978, 85 in 1979, and 83 in 1980) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980] (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
103. Se MINNESOTA BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS, ANNUAL REPORT: MINNESOTA BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1977, at 3 (Apr. 12,
1978) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1977] (on file at William Mitchell Law
Review office).
104. See id. at 4.
105. See ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980, supra note 102, at 4 (87 closed in 1980); MINNESOTA BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS, ANNUAL REPORT: MINNESOTA BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1979, at 4 (Apr. 10, 1980) (70 closed in

1979) [herinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1979] (on file at William Mitchell Law
Review office); MINNESOTA BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS, ANNUAL REPORT: MINNESOTA BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1978, at 4-5 (Mar.

5, 1979) (89 closed in 1978) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1978] (on file at
William Mitchell Law Review office).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

Physical or M ental Disability ................................
Intem perence ...............................................
Practicing Law W hile a Judge ..............................
Failure to Perform - Neglect ...............................

[Vol. 7

4
2
2
I

Two hundred and forty-six complaints were investigated and closed by
the Board in these three years.10 6 The Board's determination were as
follows: 107

84
Unfounded or Frivolous .....................................
65
M atter for Appellate Process ................................
46
Judge Corrected Problems ..................................
32
Private Reprimand, Admonition, Warning ...................
6
Lack of Jurisdiction ........................................
4
Judge Being M onitored .....................................
Disciplinary Recommendation
3
to Suprem e Court ........................................
3
O ther ......................................................
1
Judge R etired ..............................................
I
Public C ensure .............................................
1
Retired Judge - not to hear cases ...........................
The Board's effectiveness as a disciplinary system is exemplified by the
number of complaints it has received. While many complaints are dismissed as unfounded or frivolous, many others have resulted in discipline
or admonishment of judges.108 The Board has taken positive steps to
improve the judiciary. 109 In fact, more judges have been formally disciplined since the Board's creation in 1971 than there had been in Minne106. See ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980, supra note 102, at 5; ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1979,
supra note 105, at 5; ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1978, supra note 105, at 5.
107. See ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980, supra note 102, at 5; ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1979,
supra note 105, at 5; ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1978, supra note 105, at 5.
During 1980, for example, the Board conducted 23 inquiries and 20 investigations.
Thirty-seven judges were requested to respond in writing to the Board for explanation of
their alleged misconduct. Eight judges appeared before the Board to explain their conduct. The 20 investigations concerned the following allegations:
5
Slow In O rders ..................................................
3
Prejudice & Bias .................................................
3
Courtroom Demeanor ............................................
Procedural or Administrative
4
Irregularity . ..................................................
2
Personal Conduct ................................................
2
Practice of Law .................................................
I
Attorney M isconduct .............................................
Total
TO
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980, supra note 102, at 5.
108. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
109. Cf. ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1979, supra note 105, at 8 (Board believes its work is
fostering improvement in judicial conduct; Board continues to counsel with judges and
public over procedures and actions of court); note 110 infta (a number of judges have been
disciplined).
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sota's history prior to that time.'1o
The efforts of the Board on Judicial Standards have not gone unchallenged. In two recent cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been
faced with the question of whether formal judicial disciplinary proceedings violate the constitutional rights of the judges under investigation. "'
These decisions for the most part have held that judicial disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process and protect an individual's fundamental constitutional rights.' 12
IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MINNESOTA'S JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

The first case to address the constitutionality of judicial disciplinary
proceedings in Minnesota was In re GzlIard. 113 The Gillard matter had
been before the court previously,114 when Gillard had been under investigation by the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (LPRB) for
conduct prior to his appointment to the bench. 115Based on its investigation and the hearing that followed, the LPRB recommended to the
supreme court that Judge Gillard be disbarred from the practice of
law."1 6 The Board on Judicial Standards took the position that if Judge
110. Six judges have been formally disciplined by the supreme court upon the recommendation of the Board on Judicial Standards. See note 55 supra.
111. See In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979), modified, 296 N.W.2d 699
(Minn. 1980); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam).
Minnesota is not the only state that has been faced with this kind of challenge. See,
e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1975); In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 542 P.2d 767
(1975) (per curiam); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970); In re Mikesell, 396
Mich. 517, 243 N.W.2d 86 (1976) (per curiam).
112. Cf. In reMcDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648, 691 (Minn. 1979) ("Because the supreme
court's independent judgment is involved here, we are somewhat less concerned about the
possible biases and procedural shortcomings below. . . . The obvious difficulties with institutional inertia in a proceeding of this type are of concern, and we express our confidence that with additional experience the Board will act to minimize them .... "),
modified, 296 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1980); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 808-09 (Minn.
1978) (per curiam) ("Judged by these standards, we find no constitutional infirmity in the
procedure here employed. . . .The statutory standard [of Code of Judicial Conduct] is
not fatally vague or overbroad.").
113. 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam).
114. See In re Gillard, 260 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1977) (per curiam).
115. See id. at 563. The conduct under investigation occurred prior to the judge's appointment to the bench and included allegations of implying to a client that payment of a
fee was necessary to influence the granting of an insurance license, failing to provide adequate representation of clients, and representing clients when a potential conflict of interest existed. See id.
116. See id.
The respondent argued the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (LPRB) was
without jurisdiction or authority to discipline a district judge because this power was reserved exclusively to the legislature by the Minnesota Constitution. See Respondent's
Brief at 47. The court had previously denied "respondent's petition for a writ of prohibition against the LPRB proceeding because he had 'failed to sustain his burden of demon-
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Gillard was disbarred as an attorney, he should be removed from judicial
7
office without the necessity of formal proceedings before the Board.'"
The court rejected this argument and held that because Judge Gillard
was not afforded a hearing before the Board on Judicial Standards on
the question of his fitness to retain judicial office, he had not received
adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard on the question. 118 The
court ordered the matter stayed until the Board had conducted a full
investigation and hearing, including consideration of the allegations that
Judge Gillard had engaged in misconduct prior to his appointment to
the bench.11 9 The Board was requested to "make whatever findings and
recommendation to this court" it deemed appropriate.120
Following the supreme court's order the Board conducted a hearing
regarding the charges against Judge Gillard. 12 , After the hearing, the
Board filed its findings of fact and conclusions with the court, and recommended that Judge Gillard be removed from office.12 2 In his brief to the
strating lack of jurisdiction on the part of [the LPRB].' " 260 N.W.2d at 563. The court
never addressed the above question and it was in effect mooted by the court's decision to
stay the matter pending an independent investigation by the Board on Judicial Standards.
The judge made much the same argument in the second case regarding the constitutional authority of the Board on Judicial Standards and the supreme court to investigate
and discipline judges. See Respondent's Brief at 15-21, In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785
(Minn. 1978) (per curiam). The court rejected this contention. For a discussion of the
court's reasoning, see notes 125-32 bnfra and accompanying text.
117. See 260 N.W.2d at 563. The Board on Judicial Standards argued:
[T]his court has the inherent power to declare as a matter of law that the position of Judge Gillard as a Judge of the District Court of Freeborn County is
vacant by virtue of the fact that said person no longer possesses the constitutional
qualifications to hold office.
Neither the statutes relating to the Board on Judicial Standards nor the
Rules of the Board provide specifically with reference to the somewhat unique
situation of the disbarment of a sitting Judge.
Arguably, the conduct found to have occurred by Judge Fosseen [the referee
at the LPRB hearing], if sustained by this Court, would fall within the portion of
Sec. 490.16, Subd. 3, which provides for removal based upon action which "...
may constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings
the judicial office into disrepute."
Brief of Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards at 7-8, 9-10.
118. See 260 N.W.2d at 563. The Michigan Supreme Court has taken the same position. See, e.g., In re Moes, 389 Mich. 258, 205 N.W.2d 428 (1973); In re Kapcia, 389 Mich.
306, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973).
119. See 260 N.W.2d at 563. In a footnote the court indicated:
In finding that the Board on Judicial Standards has authority to scrutinize
allegations of misconduct which occurred prior to elevation to judicial office, we
adopt a position consistent with the broad language of Minn.St. 490.16, subd. 3,
and consistent with the better-reasoned opinions of other jurisdictions construing
similar statutes.
Id. at 564 n.2 (citations omitted).
120. See id.
121. See Petitioner's Brief at 2-5, In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978) (per
curiam). Briefs were filed by both sides at this hearing. See id. at 4.
122. See id. at 5.
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court, the judge raised a number of constitutional challenges to the
proceedings. 123
Essentially, Judge Gillard (respondent) raised five challenges to the
proceedings. The court addressed each argument and found that none of
the objections were valid.12 4 Respondent first argued that Minnesota
Statutes section 490.16, subdivision 3, which provides the Board on Judicial Standards with authority to recommend discipline of a judge to the
supreme court, was an unconstitutional delegation of power.1 25 Respondent argued that the power to remove a judge was a legislative function
that could not be delegated. 126 In response to this argument the court
123. See notes 125-49 infra and accompanying text.
124. See id.
125. See 271 N.W.2d at 806; Respondent's Brief at 15-30.
Respondent Gillard argued that the court could not be involved in the process of
judicial discipline because the Minnesota Constitution delegated this power to the legislature. See id. at 15-18. In support of this argument, respondent relied on the Commentary
to section 1.3 of the ABA Standards Relating to Discipline and Disability Retirement. See
id. at 29. The Commentary states "[w]hile the court has the inherent power to discipline
judges. . . it lacks the inherent power to remove them from office." STANDARDS RELATING To JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 57, § 1.3, Commentary, at 5. The relevant Minnesota statute provides in part:
On recommendation of the board on judicial standards, the supreme court may
. . . censure or remove a judge for action or inaction that may constitute persistent failure to perform his duties, incompetence in performing his duties, habitual intemperance or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute.
MINN. STAT. § 490.16(3) (1980). The Minnesota Constitution states one branch of government may not exercise any powers belonging to another branch unless expressly provided for in the constitution. See MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
126. See 271 N.W.2d at 806. In support of his argument respondent relied on article
six, section nine of the Minnesota Constitution. See id. This provision states in part: "The
legislature may also provide for the retirement, removal or other discipline of any judge
who is disabled, incompetent or guilty of conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice." MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
Alternatively, the respondent argued that if the power to remove judges was delegable it could not be delegated to another branch of government. See 271 N.W.2d at 806. In
support of this argument respondent relied on State ex rel. Thompson v. Day, 200 Minn.
77, 273 N.W. 684 (1937). See Respondent's Brief at 22. Day involved the constitutionality
of the Governor's removal of one judge from a case and, pursuant to statutory authority,
appointing another judge from another judicial district to try the matter. See State ex rd.
Thompson v. Day, 200 Minn. 77, 80, 273 N.W. 684, 685 (1937). The Minnesota Constitution, in article six, section five, permitted the legislature to provide by law that a judge of
one judicial district may discharge the duties of a judge of another district when convenience or public interest necessitated this action. See id. In Day the court held the full
power "under section 5, article 6, could be exercised by the Legislature without calling in
the executive. . . . [To construe the section otherwise] would be in derogation of the
provisions of article 3, section 1, which are fundamental to the preservation of a free democracy." See id. at 81, 273 N.W. at 686. The Gillardcourt found this case to be inapplicable: "[Day] only precludes legislative delegation of judicial power to the executive. It
says nothing about the legality of legislative delegation of judicial power to the judiciary."
271 N.W.2d at 806.
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cited several cases that upheld a delegation of quasi-judicial or judicial
27
authority by the legislature to the judiciary.
In particular, the court found State ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson 128 insightful.' 29 In Peterson the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a statute
allowing the Governor to remove county treasurers for nonfeasance or
malfeasance was not an improper delegation of the legislature's constitutional power to provide for the removal of county treasurers and other
inferior officers of the state. 130 The Gillard court noted that the constitutional provision involved in Peterson had a direct counterpart in article 6,
section 9 of the Minnesota Constitution which allows the legislature to
provide for the removal of judges.' 3' Therefore, the Gilard court had
little trouble upholding the constitutionality of the statute based on
Peterson.13 2

Respondent's second contention was that the Board's recommendation
127. See 271 N.W.2d at 806-07.
For a discussion of other cases involving the delegation of legislative duties to the
court, see, e.g., Thorland v. Independent Consol. School Dist. No. 44, 246 Minn. 96, 74
N.W.2d 410 (1956); Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist., 201 Minn. 622, 277
N.W. 208 (1938); City of Duluth v. Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n, 167 Minn. 311, 209
N.W. 10 (1926).
128. 50 Minn. 239, 52 N.W. 655 (1892).
129. See notes 130-33 iznra
and accompanying text.
130. See 50 Minn. at 244, 52 N.W. at 655. The constitutional provision in question
read as follows: "The legislature of this state may provide for the removal of inferior
officers from office, for malfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance of their duties."
MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. XIII, § 2 (current version at MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 5).
Pursuant to its constitutional authority, the legislature enacted a statute that allowed the
Governor to remove a county treasurer for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. See State
ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, 50 Minn. 239, 243-44, 52 N.W. 655, 655 (1892).
The respondent in Peterson argued "that the power of removal from office is judicial in
its nature, . . . and that, under the constitution, the legislature has no authority to provide for the removal of a county treasurer except by judicial proceedings in court." See id.
at 243, 52 N.W. at 655.
131. The court stated that "[p]ursuant to art. 13, § 2, presently found in Minn. Const.
1974, art. 8, § 5, the legislature passed a statute permitting the governor to remove county
treasurers. This statute had the same constitutional basis as Minn.St. 490.15 to 490.18."
271 N.W.2d at 807.
In his brief the respondent argued that "[t]he people of Minnesota in article 6, section
9, empowered the legislature to create a less cumbersome alternative to impeachment, but
this provision does not allow the legislature to transfer that function (as it has sought to
do) to the judicial branch." Respondent's Brief at 28. Respondent also asserted that the
appearance of bias or actions intended to avoid bias would be obviated if a legislative
agency disciplined judges. See id.
132. See 271 N.W.2d at 807. The Peterson court ruled that the statute in question was
not an improper constitutional delegation of power. See 50 Minn. at 244, 52 N.W. at 655.
Collateral support for respondent's argument, however, is found in the Commentary to
the ABA Standards that relate to judicial discipline. The Commentary states the inherent
power of a court "includes the authority to discipline judges independent of any express
constitutional grant. . . . [I]nherent power does not include the power to remove."
STANDARDS RELATING To JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 57, § 1.1, Commentary, at 3.
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of disbarment was based in part on violations that were not specified in
the petition for disbarment and thus constituted a violation of his due
process rights.' 33 The court stated that in disciplinary proceedings due
process requires that the charges be sufficiently clear and specific to allow
the respondent to develop his defense.134 The court held that the procedures employed were not unconstitutional and noted "most of respondent's objections concern a failure to allege violations of precise
disciplinary rules."'35
133. See Respondent's Brief at 61-67, In re Gillard, 260 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1977) (per
curiam). The respondent relied on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), in support of his
argument. See Respondent's Brief at 63, 65, 67 (argument was raised but not dealt with in
first proceeding; apparently court believed issue was before it, even though respondent did
not reiterate argument in second proceeding).
In Rufalo, the United States Supreme Court held petitioner's due process rights were
violated when an additional charge of misconduct was added after petitioner and one of
his employees had testified "at length on all the material facts pertaining to this phase of
the case." 390 U.S. at 550-51. "This absence of fair notice [to Ruffalo] as to the reach of
the grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges deprived petitioner of procedural due process." See id. at 552.
The GC',ard court noted, however, that subsequent decisions have failed to extend the
notice requirements of Ruffalo. See 271 N.W.2d at 808. The court also noted that the due
process standards delineated in In re Rerat, 224 Minn. 124, 28 N.W.2d 168 (1947), were
consistent with the requirement of Ruffalo. See 271 N.W.2d at 808.
134. See 271 N.W.2d at 808 (quoting In re Rerat, 224 Minn. 124, 128-29, 28 N.W.2d
168, 172-73 (1947)). Rerat states that in a disciplinary proceeding:
[I]t is essential that the requirements of due process of law be observed, and to
this end the charges of professional misconduct, though informal, should be sufficiently clear and specific, in light of the circumstances of each case, to afford the
respondent an opportunity to anticipate, prepare and present his defense.
224 Minn. at 128-29, 28 N.W.2d at 172-73.
135. See 271 N.W.2d at 808. The court also indicated that "[alt most, collateral findings of Complaints III (misrepresentations to adverse counsel and the ethics committee), X
(signing for others), and XI (falsely notarizing) involve misconduct not generally alleged
in the petitions." See id.
At first glance this appears to be both a cursory treatment of respondent's argument
and inconsistent with the Rufalo decision. A review of the record and an examination of
the cases cited by the court to the effect that Ruffalo is not extended in disbarment proceedings, however, provide support for the court's finding above.
The initial petition contained the following allegations against Judge Gillard:
That the files of prior complaints against Respondent demonstrate that Respondent has engaged in a pattern of behavior and a course of conduct, as hereinafter
more specifically set forth, demonstrating misrepresentation to his clients, failure
to make proper communication with his clients, repeated dilatory conduct in
handling of his clients' matters, neglecting his clients' affairs, and failure to fully
cooperate with the District Ethics Committee.
Petitioner's Brief at 11, In re Gillard, 260 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1977) (per curiam) (Brief for
LPRB). The supplementary petition provided in part: "That the foregoing and other
complaints reveal that Respondent has failed to maintain proper control over legal matters entrusted to him, and that Respondent's neglect has prejudiced and resulted in losses
to numerous clients." Id. at 12.
In its brief, the LPRB noted that unlike in Rufalo no new charges were added against
the respondent during the course of the proceeding. See id. at 11.Additionally, all of the
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The third constitutional issue addressed by the court was whether the
standards of judicial conduct prescribed by article 6, section 9 of the
Minnesota Constitution, and section 490.16 of Minnesota Statutes are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 136 Other jurisdictions have
issues raised and tried at the hearing arose out of the allegations contained in either the
original or supplementary petition. See id. Further, during the entire proceeding respondent's counsel made no objection that the hearing was beyond the scope of the pleadings.
See id. at 13. Additionally, respondent's counsel apparently "obtained copies of virtually
every document, witness statement, and investigative report in Petitioner's files which in
any fashion related to the allegations of unprofessional conduct brought against Respondent." See id. at 12.
Several recent decisions support the court's position. In In re Kunkle, 88 S.D. 269,
218 N.W.2d 521 (1974), the South Dakota court opined:
Although the complaint in the instant case could very well have been made
more specific with regard to respondent's alleged misconduct, we hold that it
adequately informed respondent of the nature of the charge against him ....
. . . When viewed in the light of the knowledge that respondent and his
attorneys gleaned from studying the probate file and from examining the report
of the grievance committee and the various papers filed in connection therewith,
we cannot say that respondent was misled or in any way prejudiced by the lack
of specificity in the complaint. Certainly respondent was not misled or
prejudiced in his defense to the charges in the manner in which the petitioners
may have been misled and prejudiced in the Ruffalo case, . . . inasmuch as
respondent did not testify or in any other manner take a position that was later
used as the basis of another charge against him.
See id. at 274-75, 218 N.W.2d at 524-25. In Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), a lawyer disciplinary case, the court stated much the same thing:
[D]ue process is a flexible concept, and its requirements vary with the type of
proceeding involved. . . . All that is required is that it [the petition] be sufficient to inform the . . . [person] of the nature and substance of the charges
against him and permit him to answer them.
The facts here are simply not comparable to Ruffalo. The nature of the
charge of misconduct against Javits did not change in the middle of the proceedings, as in Ruffalo, thus introducing into the case elements of unfair surprise and
entrapment totally lacking here.
See id. at 138-39 (footnotes omitted). As these cases indicate, and as the Gillardcourt held,
it is not constitutionally necessary to allege specific violations of particular disciplinary
rules.
136. See 271 N.W.2d at 809; Respondent's Brief at 31.
Arguing that an independent judiciary is no less essential than freedom of speech, the
respondent contended that such phrases as "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice" and "seriously deprecates public confidence in the integrity of the Respondent"
are hopelessly vague and seriously impair the notion of an independent judiciary. See id.
at 32-34. Respondent further argued it was particularly egregious when the judge is under
investigation for conduct that presumedly deprecates public confidence in the judiciary
when these acts were committed prior to becoming a judge. See id. at 33. Respondent also
believed that if these standards were held to be constitutional there would be far-reaching
ramifications. "If these proceedings should result in Judge Gillard's removal . . .good
lawyers asked to serve on the bench should take careful stock. . . [of] what they may be
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uniformly rejected similar challenges.137 The general statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing discipline of judges for misconduct incorporate the more specific rules of the Code on Professional
Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct.138 Although the court recognized that even these more specific provisions cannot enumerate all the
39
possible grounds for removal and that they merely serve as guidelines,1
the standards were held not to be "fatally vague or overbroad."40
In the decision concerning Judge Gillard's conduct prior to becoming
destroyed for having done-prospectively, clairvoyantly-to deprecate the bench before
they got there." Id. at 38-39.
The constitutional prohibitions of vague or overbroad laws have been described as
follows:
As a matter of due process, a law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons
"of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." Such vagueness occurs when a legislature states its proscriptions in
terms so indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guesswork. This indefiniteness runs afoul of due process concepts which require that persons be given fair notice of what to avoid ....
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-28, at 718 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
The rule against overbreadth demands that the regulation be framed to cover
only that conduct which is constitutionally subject to control, and not embrace
conduct protected under the First Amendment or conduct that might be protected but which it is not necessary to control in order to achieve the desired
objective. Failure to meet either of these requirements means that the regulation
is void on its face, regardless of the validity of particular applications.

T.

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

364-65 (1970).

137. See, e.g., Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977); Keiser v. Bell, 332
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ill.1970);
Sarisohn v. Appellate Div., Second Dep't, 265 F. Supp. 455 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); McComb v.
Commission on Judicial Performance, 19 Cal. 3d Spec. Trib. Supp. 1, 564 P.2d 1, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 459 (1977); Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 306
(Ky. 1978) (per curiam); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970); In re Foster, 271
Md. 449, 318 A.2d 253 (1974); Friedman v. State, 24 N.Y.2d 528, 249 N.E.2d 369, 301
N.Y.S.2d 484 (1969), appealdisised,397 U.S. 317 (1970); In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237
S.E.2d 246 (1977).
138. SeeIn re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 809 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam). The incorporation of the Rules on Judicial Standards is provided for in the statute. See MINN. STAT.
§ 490.16(5) (1980). The Minnesota Constitution generally provides that a judge may be
disciplined or removed for incompetency or conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 9. The statute essentially provides the same thing.
See MINN. STAT. § 490.16(3) (1980).
139. See 271 N.W.2d at 809 (quoting Sarisohn v. Appellate Div., Second Dep't, 265 F.
Supp. 455, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)). As the court indicated in a footnote, the constitutionality of broad standards regulating the professional conduct of lawyers has long been upheld. See 271 N.W.2d at 809 n.7 (quoting Ex Parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 14
(1857)). The Secombe Court stated:
[I]t is difficult, if not impossible to enumerate and define, with legal precision,
every offense for which an attorney or counsellor ought to be removed. And the
Legislature, for the most part, can only prescribe general rules and principles to
be carried into execution by the court with judicial discretion and justice as cases
may arise.
Er Parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 14 (1857).
140. See 271 N.W.2d at 809. In his brief respondent alleged:
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a judge, the court indicated the referee's findings in the first hearing by
the LPRB were not subject to collateral attack by Judge Gillard during
subsequent hearings by the Board on Judicial Standards.141
The fourth constitutional claim of the respondent was that his due
process rights were denied as a result of this limitation.14 2 According to
the Gil/lard court, further review of the evidence was not necessary and
Analogous to the protection of speech, and probably no less essential to the
health of a democratic government, is the preservation of an independent judiciary. It cannot be doubted that the tripartite system of separate powers and
checks and balances can function effectively only so long as the judge of every
bench can act without fear of the consequences of his conscientious decisions,
(and, we might add, without fear that a critical scrutiny of his every action
before becoming a judge may lead to accusations of remote improprieties unrelated to his present fitness to judge).
Respondent's Brief at 31-32 (emphasis in original). In an apparent response to this contention the court pointed out that
[t]he conduct complained of has nothing to do with conscientious, but unpopular, opinions or ex post facto definitions of unethical behavior. The misconduct
alleged includes persistent misrepresentations, dilatoriness, and bribery solicitation. Imposition of disciplinary sanctions for such conduct hardly threatens the
legitimate scope of judicial autonomy and independence.
271 N.W.2d at 809.
141. See In re Gillard, 260 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Minn. 1977) (per curiam). The Board in
the Findings and Conclusions of its recommendation of disbarment in the second proceeding indicated that pursuant to the supreme court's earlier decision it did not make a full
and independent examination of the record of the proceedings before the referee. Instead,
it accepted the supreme court's determination that the referee's findings were amply supported by the record. See Petitioner's Appendix at 18, In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785
(Minn. 1978) (per curiam).
142. See 271 N.W.2d at 810. Respondent found support for this argument in the
court's earlier decision to remand the case to the Board in which the court said "[t]he
Board shall affrd respondent all rights to which he is entitled." See Respondent's Brief at
40 (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Gillard, 260 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Minn. 1977) (per
curiam)). Respondent alleged the Board had failed to make a full and independent review of the evidence and had merely rubber stamped the referee's earlier findings. See
Respondent's Brief at 41.
The Board in its brief argued that it was not required to make a full and independent
examination of all the transcripts and exhibits of the proceedings before Referee Fosseen.
See Petitioner's Brief at 57. The Board argued it was not required to act and the supreme
court in its initial decision merely requested the Board to act. See id. at 58.
The Board's counsel seemed to question the respondent's motivation in raising this
issue:
[N]either counsel for Respondent nor Respondent, both of whom were present, objected to [the] . . .statement [that the Board did not have to examine in
detail, all the evidence contained in all 11 volumes of the record] at the Hearing.
Nor did they allege or argue at any time during the course of the proceedings
before the Board. . .that it was the responsibility of the individual members of
this Board to re-read all of the testimony and exhibits . . ..
See id. at 60. The Board indicated that there was no necessity to review the entire record
when the court found that the findings and conclusions of Referee Fosseen were amply
supported by the evidence. See id. at 62. Finally, the Board argued that it was not simply
accepting the conclusions of another body, rather it was the Board responding to a determination of the court that the referee's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence
and not subject to collateral attack. See id. at 65.
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would have served little purpose because the court had previously reviewed the evidence and found the referee's findings to be amply supported.143 The only question before the Board was whether discipline or
removal was warranted, given the misconduct.' 44 In the court's view,
the demonstrated instances of wrongdoing clearly warranted
discipline. 145
The final constitutional issue considered by the court involved various
due process challenges to the Board's proceedings.' 46 Noting that due
process requirements depend upon the nature of the proceeding, the
court stated the due process requirements of a criminal proceeding were
not applicable because judicial disciplinary proceedings are sui
generis.147 Only general due process rights of a fair and regular proceeding attach.' 48 The court found that none of the challenges to the proceedings violated the due process rights of the respondent.149
143. See 271 N.W.2d at 810. "[P]roceedings before the Judicial Board and the LPRB
both anticipate that review by the Supreme Court shall be both final and independent of
the findings and conclusions of the Judicial Board." Id. This independent review would
apparently remedy any due process defects.
144. See id.
In an effort to mitigate the charge of solicitation of bribery the respondent offered to
introduce at the Board's hearing the deposition of an acquaintance. See id. The Board
reviewed the deposition but refused to admit it, indicating that this would constitute a
collateral attack on the referee's findings. See id. It did, however, hold that this testimony
if admitted would not alter its findings. See id.
Respondent challenged the Board's recommendation because it failed to take the
deposition into account. See id. at 811. The court responded that this "error" could be
corrected on review. "Moreover, the Judicial Board's own findings and conclusions
clearly take into account the profferred evidence in alternative findings and bases for the
removal recommendation. Thus, remanding for further Judicial Board hearings is unnecessary." Id. After reviewing the deposition, the court concluded that this evidence merely
corroborated respondent's claim of ignorance with the insurance licensing process (out of
which the solicitation of bribery accusation arose). See id. The evidence did not disturb
the finding that improper payoffs were suggested. See id.
145. See id. The court noted
there is no new challenge to remaining complaints of misconduct, characterized
in the previous opinion as "a pattern of dilatory handling of clients' affairs to
their prejudice; falsely executing and notarizing affidavits; and deceiving clients
as to the status of their professional retainers." The Judicial Board found that
such misconduct was grounds for removal wholly aside from the misconduct alleged in Complaint I.
Id. (citation omitted).
146. See id. The challenges concerned the presence of a quorum, the use of Judge
Gillard's name in the caption of the proceeding, and the failure of the Board to refer the
matter to a referee. See id. For a discussion of the court's response to these challenges, see
note 149 infra.
147. See 271 N.W.2d at 812 (proceedings are sui generis, designed to protect citizenry
by insuring integrity of judges).
148. See id.; note 134 supra and accompanying text.
149. See 271 N.W.2d at 812-13. The respondent argued that because the terms of two
of the members had expired, they should have been disqualified from participating in the
proceedings. Disqualification of these two members would have resulted in there not be-
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The Minnesota court was again confronted with legal challenges to the
proceedings of the Board in In re McDonough. 51 o After several complaints
ing a valid quorum under the Board's rules. See Respondent's Brief at 51-53. The court
indicated, however, that there was a specific statutory provision that allowed Board members to serve until their successors were appointed. See 271 N.W.2d at 812. Minnesota
Statutes section 490.15, subdivision 2 provides that the "filling of vacancies on the board
shall be as provided in section 15.0575." See MINN. STAT. § 490.15(2) (1980). Minnesota
Statutes section 15.0575 provides that "[m]embers may serve until their successors are
appointed and qualify." MINN. STAT. § 15.0575(2) (1980). Thus, the respondent's argument was without merit. See 271 N.W.2d at 812. The court further opined that because it
conducts an independent review "the absence of a quorum should not be fatal, particularly where there were six members [quorum under the rules in force at the time consisted
who acted unanimously on the Gillard matter" at the
of five members] of the board, .
two meetings. See id. at 813.
The second challenge to the regularity of the proceedings was that the use of the
respondent's name in the caption of the complaint was a violation of the Board's rules. See
Respondent's Brief at 54-55. While technically a violation of the rules, the court recognized that due to the unusual procedural history of the case the charges against Judge
Gillard had been revealed in their earlier opinion. "[U]nder the circumstances of this
case, where there was little confidentiality to protect, noncompliance does not so offend
fundamental fairness as to void the proceedings." 271 N.W.2d at 813. The court, however, firmly stated "[i]n the future, more scrupulous compliance with the rules is directed
See.id.
The third claim regarding the proceedings was that the failure of the Board to refer
the matter to a referee constituted an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion. See
that the imporRespondent's Brief at 56. The court found "no error in the decision ...
tance of the matter warranted . . .[the Board's] exclusive involvement. . . . Efficiency
and economy clearly supported the decision to bypass additional review of an essentially
legal question." 271 N.W.2d at 813.
Interestingly, even if the proceedings were violative of the Board's rules, the court
could have considered the matter anyway. See id. In support of this position the court
cited In re Wireman, 367 N.E.2d 1368 (Ind. 1977) (per curiam), cert. dented, 436 U.S. 904
(1978), cerl. denied, 446 U.S. 906 (1980). See 271 N.W.2d at 814. The attorney who was
disciplined in Wireman sought to have the proceeding dismissed because he was not afforded a hearing within 60 days as required under Indiana's Disciplinary Rules. See In re
Wireman, 367 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (Ind. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904
denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980). The court disagreed noting that beyond general
(1978), cert.
due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard "there is no authority
to suggest that the expiration of a time period would establish a constitutional infirmity
mandating dismissal of all charges." &-e id.
150. 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979), modifed, 296 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1980).
Judge McDonough, interestingly enough, was involved in an earlier judicial disciplinary proceeding. In In re Bartholet, 293 Minn. 495, 198 N.W.2d 152 (1972) (per curiam),
Judge McDonough had been appointed by Judge Bartholet to appraise an estate that was
before Judge Bartholet in a probate proceeding. Judge McDonough received $6,600 for
his work as an appraiser which amounted to nothing more than "a brief and apparently
general conversation with representatives of the corporate executor, [after which Judge
McDonough]. . .signed the appraisal submitted to [him]. . .by the executor." See id. at
498, 198 N.W.2d at 154. Soon afterward, Judge McDonough contributed $1,800 to Judge
Bartholet's reelection campaign. See id. at 498-99, 198 N.W.2d at 154.
Judge McDonough indicated that he contributed to Judge Bartholet's campaign because when he had been hospitalized for back surgery, Judge Bartholet had agreed to
serve as his substitute in Washington County Probate Court. See id. at 499, 195 N.W.2d at
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regarding Judge McDonough's conduct on the bench, an investigation
by the Board was commenced.t Formal proceedings followed. The referee at the disciplinary hearing found that Judge McDonough had acted
improperly. 152 After review of the referee's report, the Board recommended to the supreme court that Judge McDonough be censured and
retired.' 5 3 The respondent argued that no sanctions should be imposed
and challenged the proceedings before the Board. 54
The first procedural challenge was that the Board had violated its rule
requiring that an investigation be initiated only after a verified grievance
is filed or upon a motion of the Board.155 No verified grievance had been
filed. Although the Board did not make a formal motion to investigate
the respondent's conduct, the minutes of a meeting conducted two weeks
after the initiation of the investigation revealed a consensus of the Board
that the investigation continue.15 6 The court indicated the technical violation was harmless because there was no claim that anything prejudicial
occurred between the initiation of the investigation and its approval by
the Board at the meeting two weeks later. 157
154. The methods used by Judge McDonough and the other two estate appraisers, who
also contributed to judge Bartholet's reelection fund, however, were labeled by the referee
who conducted a hearing on the matter as "a device 'used by the contributor which
tended to disguise the source from which the funds were secured.' " See 1d. at 499, 198
N.W.2d at 154-55. Based on this practice, as well as other disciplinary matters such as a
plea of guilty to two counts of violating Minnesota's election law, judge Bartholet was
disbarred for lacking "that sense of fidelity owed by lawyers and judges in matters of trust
reposed in them by the public." See id. at 499-500, 198 N.W.2d at 155.
For a discussion of the court's treatment of this matter in judge McDonough's disciplinary proceeding, see notes 197-200 infra and accompanying text.
151. See Brief of Petitioner at 2-3.
152. See id. at 7.
153. See id. at 80.
154. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 64-65. The respondent also disputed the factual
findings of the referee and the Board.
155. See 296 N.W.2d at 688. Although a sworn grievance had been filed in 1974, the
investigation had not begun until September of 1976, when the Board received a letter
critical of Judge McDonough from judge Albertson, the Chief Judge of the Washington
County Court. See id.
156. See id. Upon receipt of the letter critical of Judge McDonough written by Judge
Albertson, the Chairman of the Board ordered the Executive Secretary to conduct an
investigation. See id. A consensus of the Board at its October 8, 1976 meeting was that the
investigation should be continued. See id.
157. See id. The court indicated that the October 8th meeting presumably satisfied the
spirit of the rule because the Board was aware of and approved the investigation. See id.
The court did note that although it "cannot condone less than strict compliance with
procedural rules, this. . . [was] no ground for dismissal or remand." Id. The court found
there was no merit to respondent's argument that until the Notice of Inquiry was filed in
April, 1977, the Board was investigating the respondent without authorization under the
rules. See id.; Brief of Respondent at 130.
This issue has been mooted for all future cases. Presently the rules provide that "[a]n
inquiry. . . may be initiated upon any reasonable basis." MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STAN6
DARDS (a)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 768 (1980).
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Respondent's second claim was that his right under the Board's rules
to respond to the allegations of misconduct158 was prejudiced because
the Board had already decided to file a complaint against him. 159 Respondent claimed that before he exercised his right to respond to the
charges the Board's counsel informed respondent's counsel that the
Board had already decided to file a complaint.'60 As a result, respondent
claimed that he waived his right to respond thinking it would be pointless. 16 1 The court was unwilling to nullify the proceedings "on the basis
of such a double hearsay statement."162 The judge clearly had a right to
respond and was notified of that fact and thus, the court held no viola63
tion of the rule had occurred.'
Respondent also claimed that his rights were violated by the Board's
failure to provide him with an opportunity to be heard prior to the
Board's modification of the referee's findings.164 Under the rules, the
respondent had a right to oral argument upon the Board's proposal to
158. Rule D(2) provided that:
Before filing a complaint or recommending an order of private censure, the commission shall give written notice to the judge of the nature of the charges being
made against him and he shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
personally, in writing or orally, such matters as he may choose for consideration
by the commission explaining, refuting, or admitting the alleged misconduct or
disability.
Minn. R. Comm'n Judicial Standards D(2), 4 MINN. STAT. app. 10, at 6863 (1976) (repealed 1978).
The respondent also contended his rights were violated under Rule D(2) when the
Board invited him to appear at the Board's January 17, 1977 meeting and then retracted
the invitation. See 296 N.W.2d at 689; Brief of Respondent at 131-32. Although Judge
McDonough appeared, he claimed his right to be heard was violated because the Board
was against his appearing, which rendered his presentation ineffective. See 296 N.W.2d at
689.
The court ruled that there was no violation of Rule D(2) because the respondent was
afforded a right to respond pursuant to the Notice of Inquiry which was served in May,
1977. See id. "Thus, the January invitation was at the discretion of the Board, and so also
was the cancellation. Though no rule violation occurred here, this incident was nevertheless unfortunate." Id. The court noted more direct communications between the Board
and the respondent at the initial stages of the proceeding could have clarified many of the
misunderstood and unsubstantiated charges. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
The respondent argued the decision to issue a complaint violated his rights, because it
had been determined the respondent was guilty of misconduct before he had "an opportunity to state his case. Due process is the right to be apprised of the charges and the
grounds for them and be afforded an opportunity to be heard in a proper manner to refute
the charges." Brief of Respondent at 132 (citations omitted).
162. 296 N.W.2d at 689.
163. See id. "Whether or not the Board's counsel was attempting to discourage a response or just upon request trying to accurately assess the situation is a significant and
unanswered question at this point; in that respect we note the call was initiated by Judge
McDonough's counsel." Id.
164. See Brief of Respondent at 139.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss2/4

30

et al.: Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings in Minnesota
1981l

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

modify the referee's findings.16 5 Respondent's claim was not quite accurate because the Board served the respondent with tentative modifications prior to hearing any objections he might have. Only after a
response had been received from the respondent were the final Findings
and Recommendations approved, which differed in some respects from
the earlier draft. 166 Therefore, the court found no violation of the
rule. 167
In his fourth claim, the respondent argued that the Board disregarded
Rule R and thus violated his due process rights.16 8 Rule R required that
a discipline recommendation be made by at least five members of the
Board "who have considered the report of the referee and objections
thereto."' 69 The respondent claimed that only one copy of the referee's
report was available and that therefore not all the members of the Board
70
could have considered it at the time they made their final decision.'
The contention was, however, incorrect, because the minutes of the
Board's meeting revealed that copies of the report had previously been
made available to the Board's members.'71
Although the court rejected respondent's specific claims regarding alleged violations of his due process rights, it did indicate that the disciplinary proceedings were far from perfect.1 72 The court noted that the
comments of the referee173 at the formal hearing revealed certain short165. Rule N provided that if objections were filed to the referee's report or if the commission (Board) proposed to modify or reject the referee's findings, the respondent and his
counsel were to be afforded oral argument before the commission. See Minn. R. Comm'n
Judicial Standards N, 4 MINN. STAT. app. 10, at 6864 (1976) (repealed 1978).
166. See 296 N.W.2d at 689.
167. See id. The court, however, did indicate that it would have been a better procedure for respondent to have been heard on this matter: "[I1t would perhaps have been
more in keeping with the spirit of this rule for the Board to have avoided becoming committed in any way to a position before hearing from Judge McDonough." See id.at 689-90
(footnote omitted).
168. See Brief of Respondent at 140.
169. See Minn. R. Comm'n Judicial Standards R, 4 MINN. STAT. app. 10, at 6864
(1976) (repealed 1978).
170. See Brief of Respondent at 140.
171. See 296 N.W.2d at 690.
Judge McDonough also claimed that "the Board's counsel dehorred the record concerning the Neilsen note matter." See id. The Neilsen matter related to the judge's probate of the estate of an individual from whom he had borrowed money and whether the
judge had improperly excluded this indebtedness from the estate. See id. at 653-54 (reproduction of referee's Findings and Determination).
172. See id. at 690.
173. Judge Stahler's comments regarding some of the inadequacies of the proceedings
were as follows:
1. Sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support a particular charge
should be obtained prior to the issuance of a formal complaint alleging such
charge. In the instant case, the charges herein were broad and covered an extended period of time. As to several of the charges, no evidence was introduced,
and as to several other charges, clear and convincing evidence was lacking. In

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

comings in the proceedings and stated that these "procedural deficiencies
: * * should be remedied in future proceedings."1 74 These deficiencies
included (1) failure to obtain sufficient evidence to support a charge
prior to issuing a formal complaint thereby preventing respondent from
being able to prepare responses to charges for which little or no evidence
was offered; 175 (2) failure to allow sufficient time for discovery;1 76 and
view of the fact that such charges are serious, and the fact that the Respondent,
in order to meet all charges, was required to prepare proper defenses to each, he
was placed under unnecessary and undue burden in preparing to face such
charges as to which no evidence was produced.
2. Prior to pre-hearing conference, all discovery pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure should be completed. If such were done, the issues could be
narrowed and rulings made as to admissibility of a great deal of the evidence. In
the instant case, discovery was going on up to and including the time of actual
hearing, all of which prolongs the hearing and calls for legal decisions to be
made without opportunity for proper research. In this respect, the Referee seriously questions the ten dy rule set forth in G3 of the Rules of the Board of
Judicial Standards. Such rule provides that the commission shall, upon demand,
furnish not less than ten a~ys prior to any hearing, the names and addresses of all
witnesses whose testimony the commission intends to offer at the hearing, together with copies of all written statements and transcripts of testimony of such
witnesses in the possession of the commission which are relevant to the subject
matter of the hearing. The benefits of such rule are far outweighed by the benefits derived from following Discovery Procedure of the District Courts. Under
Rule G3, the respondent basically has but ten days to carry on discovery regarding information that is furnished under this rule, which in turn would not normally allow discovery to be completed prior to pre-hearing conference, and in
some instances, the hearing itself. In fairness to counsel, it should be noted that
both the counsel for the Petitioner and the counsel for the Respondent entered
into this case after the Complaint was served and the Answer made.
3. Investigation by the Board in respect to the particular charges should
be more thorough. In addition to interviewing the complainant, the investigation should include interviewing of all persons who may have knowledge about
the particular incident, even though such knowledge may prove to be adverse to
that of the complaining witness. If such practice were followed, the Board would
have a better basis upon which to determine whether a specific complaint should
result in a formal charge, and the Board would be in a better position to determine whether or not a particular charge could be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
In making the above statement the Referee is fully cognizant of the fact that
the Board has very limited investigatory personnel; however, considering the serious implications and damage that may result to ajudge against whom a charge
is made, perhaps additional personnel should be employed under such circumstances.
This problem might be in part eliminated if the judge against whom [a]
complaint is pending were given greater opportunity under Rule 2D, in addition
to being allowed to explain his defenses to the complaint, be given an opportunity to present to the Board a list of witnesses whom he desires to be interviewed
in respect to the charge.
Judge John T. McDonough, No. 76-36, at 63-65 (Minn. Bd. Judicial Standards Mar. 14,
1978) (emphasis in original).
174. See 296 N.W.2d at 690.
175. See note 173 supra. Resopbndent in fact complained "that the 'scattershot' nature
of the Board's charges, many of which went unsubstantiated. . . made the preparation of
a defense difficult and unduly burdensome." 296 N.W.2d at 690.
Support for this contention is found not only in the referee's comments but also in the
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(3) failure to conduct more thorough investigations including interviews
with individuals who may possess knowledge adverse to that of the com77
plaining party.
These procedural insufficiencies, however, did not preclude review of
the case by the court.178 Because the court's independent judgment was
involved "the allegations of unfairness surrounding this matter . . . resulted in particularly zealous study by every member of. . . [the] court
of the record," the court was "somewhat less concerned about the possible biases and procedural shortcomings below."1 79 Thus, the court concluded that none of the defects was serious enough to nullify the
proceedings and proceeded to consider the case on the merits.180
The AcDonough court then decided two additional legal issues that are
relevant to judicial disciplinary proceedings.' 8 ' The first issue was the
interpretation to be given to the statute of limitations, 182 which provided
disposition of the various complaints against Judge McDonough. The referee dismissed 4
charges because no evidence was offered, 1 was dismissed because little or no evidence was
offered, 1 was barred by the statute of limitations, 22 were not supported by clear and
convincing evidence, and I charge was not shown to have violated the judicial canons. See
Judge John T. McDonough, No. 76-36 (Minn. Bd. Judicial Standards Mar. 14, 1978),
repn'nted in In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979), modifwd, 296 N.W.2d 699
(Minn. 1980).
The referee did, however, determine that 14 of the charges against Judge McDonough were established and proved improper conduct on the judge's part. See id. (one of 14
was characterized as technical violation).
176. See note 173 supra. The respondent indicated that in many instances he was given
very short notice with which to respond to adverse claims and witnesses. See 296 N.W.2d
at 690.
177. See note 173 supra. The respondent in fact objected to the Board's policy of "investigating" a complaint by only interviewing the complainant and failing to speak with
those who might have a different story. See 296 N.W.2d at 690.
178. See 296 N.W.2d at 690-91. See also note 149 supra.
179. 296 N.W.2d at 691.
The court noted that if the procedures had affected the record the remedy would be
to remand for additional evidence. See id. Both parties, however, opposed such a solution
and praised the referee's conduct. See id.
The respondent, however, did move the court to remand the case to the referee for
the limited purpose of recommending sanctions to the court. The motion was considered
and denied by the court. See id. n.8.
180. See id. The court also expressed its belief that the procedural shortcomings encountered by Judge McDonough would be ironed out in future proceedings. "The obvious difficulties with institutional inertia in a proceeding of this type are of concern, and we
express our confidence that with additional experience the Board will act to minimize
them and avoid the assumption of an adversary posture." Id. This reference to the
Board's assuming a less adversary posture in the future may have been a response to the
respondent's complaint regarding the procedures "used by the Board when it employed
the same counsel who lost the case before Judge Stahler to advise and draft the modifications and rejections of Judge Stahler's findings and, therefore, persuade the Board of the
sufficiency of the evidence in this case." Brief of Respondent at 142-43.
181. See notes 182-92 incfa and accompanying text.
182. See 296 N.W.2d at 691.
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that "the supreme court may . . . censure or remove a judge for action
or inaction occurring not more than four years prior to such action being
reported to the board on judicial standards."183 The Board argued that
the statute allowed all incidents taking place less than four years prior to
the initial complaint to be considered.1 84 Respondent argued that only
those events occurring less than four years before the Notice of Inquiry
could be considered.18 5 The supreme court rejected both arguments and
held actions were restricted "to those incidents which were reported to the
Board within four years of their occurrence, no matter how old they are
when considered." ' 186 The statute since has been amended and presently
allows for consideration of any matter regardless of the date of
8
occurrence. 1

7

The second issue involved the meaning to be given to the "clear and
convincing" standard of proof used in judicial disciplinary proceedings.188 The respondent argued that this standard implies corroboration
183. See Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 909, § 2, 1971 Minn. Laws 1862, 1863 (amended
1978). The present statute provides that "[t]he Board is specifically empowered to reopen
any matter wherein any information or evidence was previously precluded by a statute of
limitations or by a previously existing provision of time limitation." MINN. STAT.
§ 490.16(3) (1980).
184. See 296 N.W.2d at 691. In its brief the Board stated:
to investigate fully every judge on
The Board does not have the manpower ...
whom a seemingly isolated complaint is received; yet that is what Respondent's
interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 490.16, Subd. 3, would require if other incidents
and behavior of a judge are not to be lost from the Board's (and the Supreme
Court's) consideration. If a seemingly isolated incident turns out upon full investigation following further reports of other incidents to be part of a pattern of
behavior, the Board should be allowed to consider and present evidence on conduct occurring within the statutory period .
Brief of Petitioner at 57-58.
185. See 296 N.W.2d at 691. Respondent in his brief argued
[a] four year time period should be a sufficient amount of time for the Board to
view a judge's actions.
. . . If this Court permits the Board to use past complaints as the basis for
the start of the four year statute then the Board can, in effect, nullify the operation of a limitations statute by simply never closing a single file.
Respondent's Brief at 11, 13.
186. See 296 N.W.2d at 691 (emphasis in original). The effect of this interpretation
was to eliminate one allegation of misconduct from the court's consideration and it was
disregarded in the court's imposition of sanctions. Id.
187. See MINN. STAT. § 490.16(3) (1980); note 183 supra. In a case involving discipline
of a lawyer, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a two-year statute of limitations on
lawyer disciplinary proceedings was unconstitutional "as an attempted projection of legislative power into the judicial department." In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 43-44, 266 N.W.
88, 92 (per curiam), modifed, 197 Minn. 47, 267 N.W. 142 (1936) (per curiam).
188. See 296 N.W.2d at 691.
The rules at the time provided: "The commission, upon receiving a verified statement of grievance . . . shall make a preliminary investigation to determine whether a
complaint shall be filed and a hearing held. The commission may on its own motion and
without receiving a verified statement make inquiry and a preliminary investigation

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss2/4

34

et al.: Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings in Minnesota
19811

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

of the evidence of misconduct and cited In re Boyd, 1 89 a Florida disciplinary case, in support of his argument. 190 The McDonough court, however,
rejected this contention and indicated that no mechanistic requirement is
necessary because "uncorroborated evidence may be clear and convincing."1 9 The court also stated that "depending on its source, uncorroborated evidence may be more reliable than that remotely corroborated by
192
a dubious source."'
Following resolution of these legal issues the McDonough court reviewed
the findings of the referee and the Board's modification of those findings. 193 Based on its review, the court rejected the Board's recommendation of censure and retirement stating that while the respondent's
behavior was improper it was not the result of deliberate or long-term
misconduct motivated by financial self-interest.194 Noting the respondent's twenty-three years of service as a judge, the court indicated that
except for isolated incidents the judge's conduct had been "proper and
judicious."' 195 The court merely censured the judge and fined him three
months salary. 196
.... " Minn. R. Comm'n Judicial Standards D(1), 4 MINN. STAT. app. 10, at 6863 (repealed 1978).
For a discussion of the clear and convincing standard imposed under the present
rules, see note 85 supra and accompanying text. Under Missouri's standard of proof
charges need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Duncan, 541
S.W.2d 564, 569 (Mo. 1976) (per curiam).
189. 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam).
190. See Brief of Respondent at 16-17.
The Boyd court, recognizing that Florida did not have a comprehensive body of law
on judicial discipline, analogized to lawyer disciplinary cases regarding the meaning of the
"clear and convincing" standard of proof. See In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13, 21 (Fla. 1975)
(per curiam). The court indicated that in lawyer disciplinary cases
evidence to sustain a charge of unprofessional conduct against a member of the
bar where in his testimony under oath he has fully and completely denied the
asserted wrongful act, must be clear and convincing and that degree of evidence
does not flow from the testimony of one witness unless such witness is corroborated to some extent either by facts or circumstances.
Id.
191. See 296 N.W.2d at 692.
192. See id. The court noted that uncorroborated evidence may meet this standard of
proof "if the trier of fact can impose discipline with clarity and conviction of its factual
justification." Id. "[T]o establish such an arbitrary requirement would be counterproductive ....
" Id.
193. See id. at 692-96.
194. See id. at 696 ("Removal from office is less mandatory in the absence of such
behavior."). The following are some of the complaints and charges against Judge McDonough: (1) that he had probated and closed the estate of an individual to whom he owed
money; (2) that he abused and threatened attorneys appearing before him; (3) that he
received preferential bank treatment; and (4) that he had a policy of sentencing drunk
drivers to a drug rehabilitation program without first conducting a presentence investigation. See id. at 692-96.
195. See id. at 697.
196. See id. at 698.
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Following its disposition of the case, the court issued a supplemental
order concerning an allegation of misconduct not dealt with in'
its earlier
opinion.197 The court indicated that res judicata was not directly applicable because the matter was not directly addressed in its earlier opinion.' 98 The court, however, found instructive the principle that a
judgment on the merits acts as a bar in a second suit to all matters based
on the same cause of action that might have been litigated in the first
suit. 199 Therefore, the court ruled that fundamental fairness dictated
2
that the matter be closed. 00
V.

FUTURE CHALLENGES TO MINNESOTA'S JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

To date there have been relatively few challenges to the procedures
and methods of the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards. As a result,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to articulate clearly which due
process rights apply to these proceedings. 20 The experience of other
states indicates that the Minnesota Supreme Court will be faced with a
The findings of misconduct which we have adopted collectively creates a picture
of Judge McDonough too often lacking the patience, open-mindedness, and restraint required of a judge. The Board refers to these personality factors as "lack
of judicial temperament," and we find the phrase not entirely inappropriate.
There is no doubt that, in the extreme, such lack of judicial temperament could
be of itself grounds for removal even absent self-enrichment or bad faith. The
effective functioning of the judicial system depends not only on justice in fact
being administered but that citizens feel they are being provided fair treatment
and just decisions.
Id. at 696-97. The court went on to indicate that conduct on or off the bench that tarnishes this image may in some instances be dealt with only by removal. See id. at 697.
197. See In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1980). The matter arose as a result
of the fact that the statute of limitations applicable at the time of the hearing barred
consideration of the complaint termed the "Bartholet Matter." See 1'. For a discussion of
the "Bartholet Matter," see note 150 supra. The statute of limitations, however, was
amended between the time of the hearing and oral argument before the court. See 296
N.W.2d at 699-700. The court in its earlier opinion failed both to address specifically
which limitation period applied and to adopt or reject the findings of the Board and
referee regarding the "Bartholet Matter." See id. at 700.
198. See 296 N.W.2d at 700.
199. See id. The court also indicated "[a] judgment acts as a bar in a subsequent action
not only as to issues submitted in a prior suit but also as to issues covered in the pleadings
which were not expressly determined in the first action and which were not withdrawn."
Id.
200. Stating that earlier cases expressed the court's preference for all charges of misconduct being contained in one disciplinary proceeding, the court believed that due to the
extensive proceedings to date it would be fundamentally unfair to reopen the proceedings.
See id. at 700-01.
201. The Minnesota court has indicated, however, that general due process rights to
fair and regular proceedings are applicable. See Inre Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 812 (Minn.
1978) (per curiam). In addition, the Board's rules are not helpful because they merely
provide the "judge shall be accorded due process of law." MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 9(b), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 771 (1980).
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variety of challenges to the proceedings of the Board in the future.202
The discussion that follows is an examination of how other jurisdictions
have handled various challenges to judicial disciplinary proceedings and
how the Minnesota Supreme Court is likely to resolve these challenges. 203 Where appropriate, recommended changes in the procedures
20 4
will be set forth.
A.

Combined Investigatoiy and Adjudi'cative Functions ofJudicial
Disci'thnat Systems

A number of jurisdictions have addressed the contention that the combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions of judicial disciplinary
bodies is unconstitutional2O5 because it is a denial of an individual's right
202. See notes 205-301 bnifa and accompanying text.
203. This analysis is by no means all-inclusive. For example, one area that has resulted
in a significant amount of litigation is the confidentiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings. The cases considering confidentiality are for the most part peculiar to the facts involved and thus are incapable of forming the basis of any general rule as the following
discussion indicates.
The United States Supreme Court in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978), was faced with the issue of whether criminal sanctions could be imposed for publishing truthful information relating to confidential judicial disciplinary proceedings. See id. at 837. The Court found that the publication in question was near the
core of the first amendment and the interests of the State of Virginia were insufficient to
justify the encroachment on freedom of speech. See id. at 838. The Court did recognize,
however, that the confidentiality requirement serves a valuable function and in all likelihood enhances the effectiveness of judicial disciplinary bodies. See id. at 835-36.
Several other courts have considered the issue of whether confidential judicial discipline records could be subpoenaed or discovered for use in a civil or criminal proceeding.
See, e.g., Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d I (Fla. 1974); People ex rel. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd. v.
Hartel, 72 Ill. 2d 225, 380 N.E.2d 801 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979); Council on.
Judicial Complaints v. Maley, 607 P.2d 1180 (Okla. 1980). In two cases the issue was
resolved by permitting an in camera inspection of the documents to determine what, if
any, portions of the material requested were relevant to the proceeding for which it was
sought. See Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974) (legislature sought information for
impeachment proceeding); People ex rel. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd. v. Hartel, 72 Ill. 2d 225,
238, 380 N.E.2d 801,807 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979) (judge sought material for
defense of criminal charge against him; court allowed information that plainly negated
guilt). In the third case, the court held that the Oklahoma Council on Judicial Complaints could not be compelled to answer interrogatories regarding the disposition, if any,
of a complaint filed against a judge in a libel action brought by a lawyer against a newspaper. See Council on Judicial Complaints v. Maley, 607 P.2d 1180, 1181, 1187 (Okla.
1980).
The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards has never been faced with a subpoena or
discovery request that sought information that was confidential under the rules. See Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 2. In all likelihood the Board would contest
such a request. See id. at 2-3. For a discussion of the confidentiality requirements under
the ABA Standards, see Todd & Proctor, supra note 72, at 189-99.
204. See notes 219-25, 232-34, 261, 306-07 injha and accompanying text.
205. See note 207 infra.
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to an impartial tribunal.20 6 Courts have uniformly rejected this argument and upheld the validity of the combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions of a judicial disciplinary body2O7 because it does not
violate the due process doctrine of fundamental fairness. 20 8
Minnesota is likely to reach the same result for three reasons. 20 9 First,
precedent in other jurisdictions indicates that courts will not find this
2
combination of functions unconstitutional on due process grounds. 10
Second, the United States Supreme Court, in Withrow v. Lark-n ,2 I held
that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in an
administrative agency is not unconstitutional.212 Although this decision
did not involve judicial discipline, it has been held controlling in judicial
disciplinary cases.2 1 3 Finally, if formal disciplinary proceedings are involved, the Board does not adjudicate but only makes a recommendation
of discipline to the supreme court, 214 thus, there are no combined functions to attack.
206. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975); In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 244,
237 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1977) (per curiam); f In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1970)
(claimed due process rights violated because Commission exercised functions of "investigation, prosecution, grand jury, and judge and jury of facts and law"), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
962 (1971).
207. See, e.g., Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1243-44 (D.D.C. 1977); In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975); McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 522 n.7, 526 P.2d 268, 275 n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 267 n.7 (1974); In
re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 570-71 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971); In re Rome,
218 Kan. 198, 205, 542 P.2d 676, 683 (1975) (per curiam); Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Ky. 1978) (per curiam); In re Haggerty,
257 La. 1, 12, 241 So. 2d 469, 472 (1970); In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 677-79, 304 A.2d 587,
597-98 (1973), cert. dented, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 691, 256
N.W.2d 727, 736 (1977) (per curiam); In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 529-31, 243 N.W.2d
86, 91-92 (1976) (per curiam); In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Mo. 1978); In re Duncan,
541 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Mo. 1976) (per curiam); In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 244, 237 S.E.2d
246, 252 (1977) (per curiam).
A due process challenge to an executive secretary serving as the complainant, prosecutor, factfinder, and voting member of the Board similarly has been rejected. See Keiser
v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 617-19 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
208. See McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 522 n.7,
526 P.2d 268, 275 n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 267 n.7 (1974); In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 571
(Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971).
209. See notes 210-14 iTnfa and accompanying text.
210. See Note, StateJudi4aIDitsct'p/naq Commissionsandftoceedztgs: Developing Admbnistraltive And Legal Standards For EvaluattgJudcialMsconduct, 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 685,:
693 (1979).
211. 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (investigation of alleged physician misconduct by State Examining Board).
212. See id. at 55.
213. Set, e.g., In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 691, 256 N.W.2d 727, 737 (1977) (per
curiam); In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 530, 243 N.W.2d 86, 92 (1976) (per curiam).
214. See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
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B. ProceduralDue Process-InformalStage
I.

In General

Generally, in an administrative setting an individual is not entitled to
the full panoply of due process rights when his conduct merely is being
investigated and no adjudication occurs. 2 15 Before formal proceedings
are instituted a judge has no due process right to notice that a complaint
has been filed or that an investigation has begun. 2 ' 6 Even if notice at the
informal stage was required by the Board's rules, due process does not
require that the notice set forth all the charges ultimately considered if
2 17
the judge is notified of the additional charges in a timely manner.
Further, a judge has no right to be present or to cross-examine the persons questioned at the preliminary stage of the proceedings if at that
point, the proceedings are investigatory and not adjudicatory. 2' 8
It is, however, recommended that in all cases in which the Board has
determined that an in-depth investigation should be conducted,21 9 the
judge should be notified that a complaint has been filed22o and be allowed to respond. 22 1 Although this may prove repetitious if the case proceeds to a formal hearing, such duplication is justified for two reasons.
222
If
First, the judge's response to the charges might resolve the matter.
not, it provides the judge with additional time to investigate the matter
215. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (involved question of due process
rights applicable during investigation by Civil Rights Commission of discriminatory deprivation of right to vote based on color, race, religion, or national origin).
216. See McCartney v. Commission on judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 519, 526
P.2d 268, 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1974); In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo. 1978)
(quoting McCartney) (judge claimed due process violation because notice did not indicate
investigation in progress or suggest judge's conduct was improper). The Stone court, however, held that the judge should be afforded an opportunity to respond prior to formal
charges because his response might establish that no improprieties had occurred. See id. at
373.
217. See In re Carrillo, 542 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex. 1976).
218. See In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 24-25, 306 N.E.2d 203, 208-09 (1973) (per curiam).
219. See Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 1. "After a preliminary
investigation by the executive secretary, the board will review those findings and determine whether the investigation should be continued and conducted in depth." Id.
220. Cf. STANDARDS RELATING To JUDICIAL DIsCIPLINE, supra note 57, § 4.5, Commentary, at 23 ("As a matter of fact, in a great majority of the cases, this notice should be
given."). Under the current rules, notice of the complaint is discretionary prior to a finding of probable cause. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 6(d)(l), 9 MINN. STAT.
765, 769 (1980).
221. In fact, at least one jurisdiction requires the judge be notified and allowed to
respond before an investigation is begun. See McKenney v. Commission on Judicial Conduct, __ Mass. -,
, 402 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 (1980).
222. As the referee in the McDonough matter noted, the failure of the Board to investigate adequately several of the charges prior to the formal hearing resulted in the respondent's preparing a defense to a charge on which little or no evidence was offered. See note
173 supra. See also note 216 supra.
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in preparation for the possibility of a formal hearing. 2 23 Second, should
the Board decide to discipline the judge informally,224 notice would be
2 25
mandated by notions of due process and fundamental fairness.
2. D'sciphne at Informal Stage
When an administrative agency adjudicates, due process requires an
opportunity to be heard and to examine witnesses.226 Although the

Board on Judicial Standards is not an administrative agency, the proce2 27
dures used by the Board must comport with due process notions.
Under present procedures, the Board may impose sanctions upon a
judge's conduct or issue a private reprimand even if it has determined
that there is no probable cause to proceed to a formal hearing.228 The
rules do not provide a judge with an opportunity to be heard at this
stage. 229 In practice, however, the Board normally notifies the judge of
23 0
the complaint and allows him to respond during the informal stage.
The rule allowing the Board to impose sanctions on a judge's conduct is
unconstitutional because the judge is not allowed an opportunity to be
23
heard commensurate with due process. '
Because informal discipline is in effect an adjudication, fundamental
fairness and due process require that the individual to be disciplined be
223. Thus a judge would have time to investigate a matter before being required to
respond to a statement of allegations.
224. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS

6

(g), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769 (1980).

The Standards allow the Board to make any of the following dispositions: "1) The board
may issue a private reprimand. 2) The board may by informal adjustment dispose of a
complaint by: (i) Informing or admonishing the judge that his conduct is or may be cause
for discipline; (ii) Directing professional counseling or assistance for the judge; or
(iii) Imposing conditions on a judge's conduct." Id.
225. See note 226 in/fa and accompanying text. But cf. STANDARDS RELATING To JuDICIAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 57, § 4.5, Commentary, at 23 (notice should be delayed if
identity of complainant could be readily determined or if it would enable judge to destroy
evidence).
226. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969).
227. See note 201 supra and accompanying text; cf. Cohn, The liniteddue process rights of
judges in disciph'naryproceedings, 63 JUDICATURE 232, 237 (1979) (general due process decisions of United States Supreme Court "are so clearly apt as constitutional principle as to
virtually foreclose further controversy").
228. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 6(g), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769 (1980). See

also notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text. The Board has in fact exercised this power.
See ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1980, supra note 102, at 5.
229. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
230. See Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 1.
231. See notes 226-29 supra and accompanying text. See also B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 67, at 192 (1976) ("Procedural due process is essentially a requirement of
notice and hearing."); cf. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 241-42, 237 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1977)
(per curiam) ("fundamental fairness entitles the judge to a hearing" when censure or removal is likely). This would not be true in those instances in which the Board has allowed
the judge to respond following notice of the complaint.
Other commentators consider the ABA's rule, which is similar to the Minnesota rule,
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notified of the charges and allowed an opportunity to be heard. 232
Therefore, the rules of the Board should specifically provide for notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of informal discipline. 233 Alternatively, the power of the Board to dispose informally of
the complaint should be limited to issuing a private warning or repri234
A warning or reprimand is not an adjudication that infringes
mand.
upon a judge's rights or actions and therefore, the due process requirement of a hearing would not be mandated.
3.

Interim Suspension

Under certain circumstances a court may order the suspension of a
judge before final resolution of disciplinary proceedings. 235 Interim suspension has been challenged on the grounds that it is a deprivation of
to be troublesome because it grants "a peculiarly wide scope of discretion to the commission." Se Todd & Proctor, supra note 72, at 184-85.
The ABA Standards attempt to avoid this problem by requiring that the judge being
informally disciplined sign a waiver of his right to object to the findings and his right to a
hearing. See note 72 supra.
The constitutionality of imposing discipline at the informal stage is to be distinguished from interim suspension because the latter does not become final until the court
has reviewed the matter and the judge has had an opportunity to be heard. See notes 23544 infta and accompanying text. There is no procedure under the rules for review of the
Board's imposition of discipline or sanctions at the informal stage.
A further argument concerning the constitutionality of informal discipline is found in
People ex ret. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 445, 372 N.E.2d 53 (1977).
There, the court stated:
Inasmuch as the Commission is not a part of the tripartite court system in this
State, it possesses no power to interpret statutory ambiguities or to compel judges
to conform their conduct to any such interpretation. . . . To grant the Commission such authority would interfere with an independent judicial system and
would place trial judges in an untenable position.
See id. at 473, 372 N.E.2d at 66. Based on the Harrod court's reasoning, a judge who failed
to comply with or awkwardly construed Minnesota's sentencing guidelines could not be
informally disciplined because his conduct involved construction of a statute whose meaning is to be determined by the courts.
232. See notes 226-27, 231 supra and accompanying text.
233. Although the Board may follow such a procedure on its own initiative, see Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 1, the rules should incorporate this procedure. When the fundamental rights of an individual are involved, such procedures should
not be at the discretion of the Board. California specifically provides for review by the
supreme court when there is private admonishment by the California Commission. See
note 43 supra.
234. The Board would thereby be prevented from imposing conditions on the judge's
conduct or directing counseling for the judge as it may under the current rules. See MINN.
R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS

6

(g) (2) (ii)-(iii), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769 (1980).

The power to discipline lawyers informally, on the other hand, is expressly limited to
issuing a warning. See RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

7(b)(l),

8(c)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. 748, 752 (1980). The lawyer concerned may request the propriety
of the warning be reviewed by a panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board.
See id. 8(c)(2)-(3), 9 MINN. STAT. at 752.
235. See, e.g., In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 682 & n.5, 256 N.W.2d 727, 733 & n.5
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liberty or property contrary to both state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process. 236 A judge, however, does not have a federal constitutional right to hold or retain a state judicial office. 2 37 Rather, such a
right derives from a state's constitution or statutes 238 and a state may set
appropriate standards of conduct for those holding judicial office.239
Permanent removal of a judge occurs only after a full and complete hearing on the charges.2 40 As a general rule, due process does not require
that the right to a full and fair opportunity to be heard be provided prior
to the suspension of employment. 241 Therefore, because there is no constitutional right to retain judicial office, temporarily removing a judge
from office with full pay for an alleged violation of judicial standards and
subsequently affording the judge a full and complete hearing does not
242
offend due process.
Minnesota's constitution specifically provides that a judge may be removed from office for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 243 Therefore, interim suspension of a judge under Minnesota's
present procedures if followed by a full and complete hearing would not
(1977) (per curiam); MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 7, 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769-70
(1980).
236. See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (federal
constitution); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 682, 256 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1977) (per curiam)
(state and federal constitutions).
In both cases the judge argued the interim suspension damaged his good name, reputation, and opportunity to be elected, to which each court responded: "One's good name
and reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as employment, however, do not implicate any 'liberty' or 'property' interests 'sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.'" See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp.
1132, 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 685, 256 N.W.2d 727, 734
(1977) (per curiam) (quoting Gruenburg).
237. See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Peterson
v. Knutson, 367 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D. Minn. 1973), af'd, 505 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1974);
1970); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665,
Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 79, 85 (N.D. I11.
682, 256 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1977) (per curiam).
238. See, e.g., Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In
re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 682, 256 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1977) (per curiam); MINN. CONST.
art. VI, § 7.
239. See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In re Del
Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 683, 256 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1977) (per curiam). The Del Rio court
noted "[t]here is no federal constitution stricture that this Court is aware of which mandates that a state must permit a judge to hold judicial office unhampered by appropriate
standards of judicial conduct." Id. (citation omitted).
240. See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In re Del
Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 684, 256 N.W.2d 727, 734 (1977) (per curiam).
241. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974) (Court upheld administrative
procedure whereby individual was suspended from office and then allowed full hearing;
procedure satisfied due process clause).
242. See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In re Del
Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 684, 256 N.W.2d 727, 734 (1977) (per curiam); note 241 supra.
243. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
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violate a judge's due process rights.

501

24 4

4. Preheang Discovey
Currently, Minnesota allows for discovery only after a finding of probable cause to proceed has been made. 2 4 5 This practice is derived from

the rule requiring the proceedings to be confidential prior to the probable cause determination. 246 Because the proceedings are merely investigatory at this juncture, a judge would not have a due process right to
discovery. 247 In at least one instance, however, the Minnesota Board has
allowed discovery prior to the formal hearing stage. 248 One possible explanation for such a procedure is that it permits a judge to formulate
better a response to a disciplinary charge, thus reducing the number of
charges at the formal hearing, if not eliminating the need for formal pro2 9
ceedings altogether. 4
244. Se notes 235-42 supra and accompanying text. The present procedures provide
for review of an interim suspension when a misdemeanor charge is filed or if the judge is
found incompetent by the Board. MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 7(c)-(d), 9 MINN.
STAT. 765, 769-70 (1980). The rules fail to specify whether there is review of an interim
suspension when the judge has been charged with violation of a felony under state or
federal law. See id. at 7(a), 9 MINN. STAT. at 769.
The Minnesota procedures are different from the two cases in which interim suspension was upheld. In both cases the interim suspension occurred only after the judge was
allowed to respond to the charges, even though the full and complete hearing did not
occur until after the interim suspension. See Gruenburg v. Kavanagh, 413 F. Supp. 1132,
1136 (E.D. Mich. 1976); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 683, 256 N.W.2d 727, 733-34 (1977)
(per curiam). The Minnesota procedures contain no such requirement. See MINN. R. BD.
JUDICIAL STANDARDS 7, 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 769-70 (1980).
245. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 8(d)(3), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 770 (1980).
The extent to which, if any, a judge is entitled to discovery prior to a probable cause
determination is unclear. The Michigan court in In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 256
N.W.2d 727 (1977) (per curiam), held that a judge's due process rights were not violated
when he was denied precomplaint discovery, reasoning that a party to a quasi-judicial
proceeding is not constitutionally entitled to discovery. See id. at 687 & n.7, 256 N.W.2d at
735 & n.7.
246. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 5(a)(1), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 768 (1980)
("All proceedings shall be confidential until there has been a determination of probable
cause and formal charges have been filed pursuant to Rule 8 (c).").
The Michigan court has noted:
[T]he policy of confidentiality protects . . . witnesses and citizen complainants.
If the respondent and others similarly situated were allowed to discover the
name of every complainant, including those who will not appear and those
whose complaints have been dismissed, the free flow of information to the Commission would be curtailed. The Commission carefully investigates all complaints and this Court would not want to discourage citizen complainants from
voicing their ideas.
In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 534, 243 N.W.2d 86, 94 (1976) (per curiam).
247. Cf. note 215 supra and accompanying text (full panoply of due process rights do
not attach during investigatory stage of proceedings).
248. See Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 1.
249. Cf. In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Mo. 1978) (judge should be allowed re-
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L

t'scovery

Several courts have addressed the question of whether a judge is enti2 50
tled to full discovery at the prehearing stage of formal proceedings.
These jurisdictions have held that the extent of discovery rests in the
sound discretion of the presiding authority. 2 51 The limits on discovery
have included prohibiting the deposing of witnesses,252 allowing only
three depositions on the judge's behalf,253 and prohibiting the use of
2
interrogatories. 54
Because the Minnesota rules provide for discovery to the same extent
as that permitted in civil proceedings, it is unlikely that Minnesota will
face this issue.2 55 The amount of time available for discovery prior to the
formal hearing is, however, limited to fifty days. 256 This short period of
time, in effect, prohibits extensive discovery. 257 If broad discovery is the
desired result, fundamental fairness would seem to dictate that a judge
be allowed more time to prepare for the hearing. 2 58 Further, during the
first twenty days of this fifty-day period much of the judge's time and
effort and that of his counsel is spent preparing a response to the statesponse at informal stage because judge's account may reveal no improprieties occurred
thus obviating need for formal hearing or reducing charges in formal complaint).
250. See, e.g., McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512,
520, 526 P.2d 268, 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1974); In re Dupont, 322 So. 2d 180, 183
(La. 1975); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 686, 256 N.W.2d 727, 735 (1977) (per curiam); In
re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 531, 243 N.W.2d 86, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam); In re Bates, 555
S.W.2d 420, 429 (Tex. 1977); In re Van Susteren, 82 Wis. 2d 307, 313, 262 N.W.2d 133,
136 (1978) (per curiam).
251. See McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512, 520, 526
P.2d 268, 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1974); In re Dupont, 322 So. 2d 180, 183 (La. 1975)
(judge failed to establish he was prejudiced by limit on discovery); In re Mikesell, 396
Mich. 517, 532, 243 N.W.2d 86, 93-94 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting McCartney) (judge
sought names of all complainants); In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420, 429 ('ex. 1977) (trier of
fact did not abuse discretion by limiting judge to three depositions).
252. See, e.g., McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512,
520, 526 P.2d 268, 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1974); In re Dupont, 322 So. 2d 180, 183
(La. 1975).
253. See In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420, 429 (Tex. 1977).
254. See, e.g., McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal. 3d 512,
520, 526 P.2d 268, 273, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1974); In re Dupont, 322 So. 2d 180, 183
(La. 1975).
255. See note 82 supra. The judge may subpoena individuals to testify including the
complainant. See Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 2.
256. The hearing begins 30 days after the judge's response to the statement of allegations and the judge is allowed 20 days to respond. Se MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 8(c)(3), (d)(l), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 770 (1980). In extraordinary circumstances the
Board may extend the hearing date. See id. 8(d)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. at 770.
257. Cf. notes 173-77 supra (comments of referee indicating that 10-day time period for
discovery under old rules is inadequate).
258. But seeIn re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 356 So. 2d 172, 175 (Fla. 1978) (per
curiam). "The period of approximately three and one-half months between the service of
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ment of allegations.259 The remaining thirty days is too short a period of
26
time for the judge to conduct discovery. 0
Although the Board may extend the hearing date in extraordinary circumstances, 26 1 it could be argued that extraordinary circumstances are
present in virtually every case because of the limited time for discovery.
To allow for adequate discovery and preparation for the hearing by the
judge and his counsel, the length of time between the serving of the statement of allegations and the hearing date should be extended.
2.

Amendment of Charges

Under Minnesota's present rules, the statement of allegations of misconduct may be amended by leave of the Board or consent of the judge
under investigation after commencement of the hearing only if the
amendment is technical in nature and the judge is allowed adequate
time to respond. 262 The rules do not, however, specify what is meant by
a "technical" amendment, nor do they indicate if there are procedural
26 3
requirements for amending the charges prior to the hearing.
Two jurisdictions have specifically addressed a due process challenge
to an amendment of the formal charges at or before the hearing. 264 In
each case, the court ruled that if the judge is provided an opportunity to
investigate the charge and prepare a defense, no due process violation
notice and the commencement of hearing provided ample time to retain counsel and prepare a defense to the charges." Id.
Minnesota's rules were patterned after the ABA rules. See Interview with George J.
Kurvers, supra note 57, at 1. The ABA rules provide the judge should be allowed ample
time to prepare for the hearing, and be allowed broad discovery so that formal hearings
can be expedited. Set STANDARDS RELATING To JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 57,
§§ 5.4, .7 & Commentary, at 36-37. Thus, a lengthier period of time for discovery seems
justified.
259. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 8(a)(3), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 770 (1980)
(judge has 20 days to respond to verified complaint or statement of allegations).
260. This is particularly true in light of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure which
do not require a response to discovery motions until 30 days following service. See MINN.
R. Civ. P. 33.01(2), 34.02, 36.01, 9 MINN. STAT. 212, 213, 215-16 (1980). As a result, the
judge and his counsel may not receive a response to the discovery motions until the eve of
the hearing. A further complication arises when the judge is not only seeking discovery
but is requested to furnish information or documents pursuant to the discovery methods
allowed. As a result, the judge's ability to investigate and prepare for the hearing is impaired further.
261. See MINN. R. BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 8(d)(2), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 770 (1980).
What constitutes extraordinary circumstances is not defined under the rules.
262. See id. 9(d), 9 MINN. STAT. at 771.
263. In In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam), the Minnesota court
indicated that the notice must be such that the charges are clear and specific, allowing the
judge time to prepare his response. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
264. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172, 175 (Fla. 1978) (per
curiam); In re Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270, 278 (Mo. 1980) (per curiam).
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has occurred. 265 Therefore, an amendment to the charges prior to the
266
hearing may be constitutionally permissible.
Specific ConstitutionalChallenges

D.
I.

First Amendment Challenges

In several instances, judges have protested the consideration by judical
disciplinary boards of statements made in the performance of their judicial duties on the ground that it is an infringement of their first amendment 267 right of free speech.2 68 Noting that the right of free speech is not

absolute, the courts have held that the right is circumscribed by the Code
of Judicial Conduct. 269 In light of the added responsibilities a judge assumes in taking office and the need for public confidence in and respect
for the judiciary, reasonable limits on a judge's exercise of free speech are
necessary. 2 70 Thus, judicial conduct that involves the exercise of free
speech is not exempt from consideration as an instance of judicial
misconduct.271
The issue of whether a judge may be disciplined for exercising the first
265. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172, 175 (Fla. 1978) (per
curiam); In re Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270, 270-79 (Mo. 1980) (per curiam).
In Brzggs the respondent judge was provided with a six-day continuance to peruse the
evidence that formed much of the basis for the amended charges. See id. Further, much of
the evidence relative to the amended charges had been elicited at the beginning of the
hearing. See id. After the continuance, respondent's counsel indicated he was ready to
proceed and declined an additional continuance. See id. at 278-79. The Bnggs court
therefore ruled there was no want of due process. See id. at 279.
Despite its holding, the Florida court acknowledged its prior statement that "there is
little necessity and great potential harm in a rule which allows the Commission to set forth
additional facts by amendment to the formal charges after the Commission has conducted
its hearing and the charges have been filed with this Court." In re Inquiry Concerning a
Judge, 357 So. 2d 172, 175-76 n.2 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam). The rule allowing such a
procedure has been repealed. See id.
266. See notes 264-65 supra and accompanying text. In a related area, the Gillard court
noted that due process merely requires that the charges be sufficiently clear and specific to
allow the respondent to develop his defense. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
267. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
268. See Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1240-41 (D.D.C. 1977); In re Kelly, 238
So. 2d 565, 568-69 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971); In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198,
205, 542 P.2d 676, 684 (1975) (per curiam).
269. See Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1241 (D.D.C. 1977); In re Rome, 218
Kan. 198, 205, 542 P.2d 676, 684 (1975) (per curiam).
In the case of In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 569 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962
(1971), the Florida court indicated the manner and methods used by a judge in criticizing
his fellow judges did not involve the judge's right to freedom of speech and therefore could
be considered as conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary. See id.
270. Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1241 (D.D.C. 1977); In re Rome, 218 Kan.
198, 205, 542 P.2d 676, 684 (1975) (per curiam); Note, supra note 210, at 695.
271. See Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1241 (D.D.C. 1977); In re Rome, 218
Kan. 198, 205, 542 P.2d 676, 684 (1975) (per curiam).
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amendment right of association has arisen in at least two instances.272
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in In re Bontn 273 stated that "it is clear
that judges. . . must suffer from time to time such limits on [their] rights
[of speech and association] as are appropriate to the exercise in given
situations of their official duties or functions."274 Thus, the court held
that the judge's attendance at a rally that was a fundraiser for a case
pending before the court on which he served was improper and discipline
for such conduct did not unreasonably abridge his first amendment right
275
to association.
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has held that an investigation of a judicial candidate's campaign activities is not barred on the
ground that the activities are absolutely protected by the first amendment. 276 According to the court, misconduct that occurs in a political

forum cannot be shielded from scrutiny because any first amendment
implications are far outweighed by the state's interest in the integrity of
277
the judiciary.
2.

Ex Post Facto Laws

In several instances judicial disciplinary proceedings have been attacked on the ground that they violated the constitutional prohibition of
272. See, e.g., In re Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978); Nicholson v. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 409 N.E.2d 818, 431 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1980)
(per curiam).
The first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging...
the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CONST. amend. I. One commentator
indicates this phrase has been construed by the courts to mean "a right to join with others to
pursuegoals independentlyprotectedby theftrst amendent." L. TRIBE, supra note 136, § 12-23, at
702 (emphasis in original).
273. 375 Mass. 680, 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978).
274. Id. at 709, 378 N.E.2d at 684.
275. See id. at 699-700, 710, 378 N.E.2d at 682, 684-85.
276. See Nicholson v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 50 N.Y.2d 597, 607-08, 409
N.E.2d 818, 823, 431 N.Y.S.2d 340, 344-45 (1980) (per curiam).
277. See id. at 608, 409 N.E.2d at 823, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 345. The Nicholson court stated:
"In furtherance of the interest in ferreting out corrupt practices, the commission may legitimately request information about solicitations for contributions and attendance at fundraisers." Id. at 609, 409 N.E.2d at 823, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 345. The court further stated:
Whether and in what circumstances charges of improper fundraising activities or
judicial favoritism ultimately can be sustained against a First Amendment challenge need not now be decided. The mere filing of an administrator's complaint,
alleging improprieties in the conduct of an election campaign and its aftermath,
simply has too remote an impact on protected rights of political expression to
support the instant claim.
In sum, we conclude that the First Amendment does not preclude this investigation. While we would not hesitate to restrain official action that threatens to
chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, no such result attends the investigation . ...
Id. at 610, 409 N.E.2d at 824, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
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ex post facto laws278 because the alleged misconduct occurred before the
disciplinary board was established.2 79 Because the proceedings are not
criminal in nature and their aim is not punishment, the prohibition of ex
post facto laws is unavailable as a defense.280 Thus, a judge may be disciplined or removed by procedures not in existence at the time the misconduct occurred. 281 Due process would, however, require that the
28 2
conduct be improper when committed.
3.

Ffth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Refusal to Testify

The privilege against self-incrimination "may be invoked in any proceeding against an individual, either civil or criminal, in which testimony
or evidence is requested of that individual which could expose him to
later criminal prosecution." 28 3 In Spevack v. Klein, 284 the United States
278. Both the Congress and the states are prohibited from passing ex post facto laws.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.3, § 10, cl.1.
279. See Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 620 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Nicholson v. Judicial
Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1978) (per curiam); In re
Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 492-93, 294 N.W.2d 485, 490 (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
994 (1980).
280. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172, 180-81 (Fla. 1978) (per
curiam); Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky.
1978) (per curiam); In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 493-94, 294 N.W.2d 485, 490-91 (per
curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); cf.Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 622-24 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (judge has no constitutional right to be disciplined by procedures existing at
time of misconduct and ex post facto claim is without merit).
281. See Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 624 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Nicholson v. Judicial
Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1978) (per curiam); In re
Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 493-94, 294 N.W.2d 485, 490 (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
994 (1980).
282. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172, 181 (Fla. 1978) (per
curiam). The Florida court stated:
Due process . . . contemplates notice that an act is a removable offense at
the time it is committed. Any other conclusion would expose judicial officers to
the unfair and untenable situation in which even innocent acts of today could
someday be declared improper and subject them to punishment or removal from
office. . . . Judicial officers are justified in relying on the current rule and in
conducting themselves accordingly.
See id. The court therefore prospectively applied an amendment to the rules on judicial
conduct that allowed a judge to be removed from office for misconduct, even though his
motives were good and wholesome. See id. at 180-81. The amendment added the following language: " 'Malafides, scienter or moral turpitude on the part of a justice or judge
shall not be required for removal from office of a justice or judge whose conduct demonstrates a present unfitness to hold office.' " Id. at 180 (footnote omitted).
The Wisconsin court rejected this argument to the extent that the conduct in question occurred prior to the court's becoming constitutionally authorized to suspend or remove a judge. Seeln re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 494, 294 N.W.2d 485, 491 (per curiam),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). The court reasoned that the Code of Judicial Conduct
had been in effec.t at the time the misconduct occurred and therefore the judge knew what
kind of conduct was expected of him and that sanctions could be imposed. See id. at 49394, 294 N.W.2d at 491.
283. Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037
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Supreme Court held that an attorney could not be disbarred for invoking
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. 285 One year later
the Court in Gardner v. Broderck,286 indicated that the Spevack decision
was inapplicable if the individual invoking the privilege was a public
28 7
official.
The Gardner Court distinguished Spevack on the ground that unlike a
lawyer, a public official is directly responsible to his constituency and
owes it his entire loyalty.2 88 "He is a trustee of the public interest, bearing the burden of great and total responsibility to his public employer."28 9 The state, therefore, has the right to inquire whether a public
official is properly exercising his duties. 290 The Gardner Court indicated
that a public official may refuse to answer questions relating "specifically, directly, and narrowly" to the exercise of his official duties without
being required to waive immunity with respect to the use of his answers
in a criminal prosecution. 2 9 1 The official, however, could not use the
privilege against self-incrimination to bar his dismissal based on his failure to answer these questions.292
Following Gardner, several courts have held that a judge has no right to
refuse to testify in judicial disciplinary proceedings 293 and "can refuse
(1972); cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968) ("Our decisions establish beyond dispute the breadth of the privilege to refuse to respond to questions when the result
may be self-incriminatory and the need fully to implement its guaranty."). For a discussion of the Napo/ilano decision, see note 297 infia and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the Gardner decision, see notes 286-92 ifla and accompanying text.
284. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
285. See id. at 514 (overruling Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961)). In Spevack, the
attorney refused to respond to a subpoena duces tecum requesting the production of
financial records on the ground that the records would tend to incriminate him. See id. at
512-13. The Spevack Court reasoned:
The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional
reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer
relinquish the privilege. That threat is indeed as powerful an instrument of compulsion as "the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him ....
Id. at 516 (citation omitted).
286. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
287. See id. at 278. In this case, a policeman was dismissed for refusing to testify at a
grand jury proceeding or sign a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at
274-75.
288. See id. at 277-78.
289. Id.
290. See Cohn, supra note 227, at 240; cf. notes 291-92 infia and accompanying text
(judge may be disciplined for failing to answer questions directly related to official duties).
291. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968). The Gardner Court reversed
the dismissal of the policeman because his grand jury testimony was demanded in part for
the purpose of prosecuting him "and not solely for the purpose of securing an accounting
of his performances-of his public trust." See id. at 279.
292. See id. at 278.
293. See McComb v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. App. 3d 89, 98, 137 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238
(1977) (review of contempt order for failing to submit to deposition in disciplinary pro-
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only to disclose a matter that may tend to incriminate him." 294 A
judge's refusal to testify may be considered against him and is a proper
subject of comment. 29 5 In one case, a judge's invocation of his fifth
amendment right in response to questions directly and narrowly related
to the performance of his official duties was "in itself sufficient cause for
removal of [the] Judge." 296 Further, a grant of transactional immunity
in grand jury proceedings does not operate as a bar to consideration of
such testimony in judicial disciplinary proceedings.2 97 Additionally, the
furnishing of information or the filing of a response by a judge may constitute a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.298
4. Szth Amendment Rights
The guarantees of the sixth amendment apply only to criminal proceedings. 299 Minnesota and other jurisdictions have consistently held
ceeding); In re "Judge Anonymous," 590 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Okla. 1978) (judge refused to
testify before judicial disciplinary body). But cf. In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 13, 241 So. 2d
469, 473 (1970) (taken for granted that respondent not required to testify).
294. McComb v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. App. 3d 89, 98, 137 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238
(1977); see Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 83, 85 (N.D. Ill. 1970) ("The spectacle of a
judge invoking the Fifth Amendment is not a pretty one, for a judge owes an obligation to
cooperate in promoting enforcement of the law."), afd, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1037 (1972); In re "Judge Anonymous," 590 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Okla. 1978) (quoting McComb).
denied, 442
295. See In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 152, 250 S.E.2d 890, 915 (1978), cert.
U.S. 929 (1979). Speaking with reference to a judge's failure to take the stand during a
disciplinary hearing, the Peoples court stated: "Surely no judge but one with a 'substantial
fear of the results of the investigation' would have made the elections and followed the
course which Respondent has taken in this case." Id.
296. In re Sarisohn, 27 A.D.2d 466, 469, 280 N.Y.S.2d 237, 243 (1967) (per curiam),
rev'don other grounds, 21 N.Y.2d 36, 233 N.E.2d 276, 286 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1968).
297. See Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 283-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037
(1972). Initially, the judge refused to testify before a grand jury investigation concerning
the administration and management of the Illinois State Fair, for which the respondentjudge had numerous contracts for concession space. See id. at 281. In return for his testimony the judge was granted transactional immunity. Id. Subsequently, the judge's testimony was used in disciplinary proceedings against him and he challenged this evidence on
the ground that it violated the fifth amendment. See id. at 282-83. The court held such
testimony was not improperly admitted because judicial disciplinary proceedings are not
penal in nature and the transactional immunity was coextensive with the respondent's
privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 284.
298. Seelnre Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 13, 241 So. 2d 469, 473 (1970) (no privilege claimed
at time statement was furnished). The court stated: "The voluntary furnishing of his
exculpatory version of the incident waives his privilege against testifying . . .since this
statement was furnished as part of the removal proceedings." Id. The Haggerty court also
noted that this privilege "is personal to the witness and may not be claimed by anyone
else, not even his own counsel." Id. at 14-15, 241 So. 2d at 473 (citation omitted).
299. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; cf. In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 204, 542 P.2d 676,683
(1975) (per curiam) (right to jury trial under sixth amendment extends only to cases in
which right existed at common law and judicial disciplinary proceedings do not stem from
common law).
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that judicial disciplinary proceedings are not criminal in nature. 300
Thus, the sixth amendment guarantees of a right to trial by jury, right to
counsel, and right of confrontation are not applicable to judicial discipli3°
nary proceedings. O
Minnesota and other jurisdictions, however, allow
the respondent-judge to have counsel3O2 and to confront witnesses.303
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards represents a significant
improvement over the traditional methods of judicial discipline. The
Board has generated an increased awareness of the need to discipline the
misconduct ofjudges and provides an accessible forum for handling complaints of judicial misconduct. Recent cases in Minnesota and elsewhere
indicate that the proceedings generally comply with due process. 30 4
There are, nevertheless, several areas in which Minnesota's proceedings
run afoul of due process requirements or notions of fundamental fairness. 30 5 To provide greater protection for the rights of the individuals
involved, several changes in the procedures are necessary.
First, if the Board decides to conduct an in-depth investigation, the
rules should provide that the judge be notified of the complaint and allowed to respond. Second, because informal discipline presently constitutes an adjudication, the rules of the Board should be amended to
provide a judge with a due process right to notice and an opportunity to
300. See Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 619 (E.D. Pa. 1971); McComb v. Commission
on Judicial Performance, 19 Cal. 3d Spec. Trib. Supp. 1, 9, 564 P.2d 1, 5, 138 Cal. Rptr.
459, 464 (1977) (per curiam); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 812 (Minn. 1977) (per
curiam); Sharpe v. State ex rtl. Okla. Bar Ass'n, 448 P.2d 301, 307 (Okla.), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 904 (1968).
301. See notes 299-300 supra and accompanying text.
In several instances judges have unsuccessfully argued that they were entitled to a
jury trial. See McComb v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 19 Cal. 3d Spec. Trib.
Supp. 1, 10, 564 P.2d 1, 6, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459, 464 (1977) (per curiam); In re Rome, 218
Kan. 198, 204, 542 P.2d 676, 683 (1975) (per curiam); cf. In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485,
495-96, 294 N.W.2d 485, 492 (per curiam) (no due process right to jury trial), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 994 (1980). In addition, courts have held a judge does not have a sixth amendment right to confront witnesses. See Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608, 619 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
In re "Judge Anonymous," 590 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Okla. 1978). But cf. note 303 infia and
accompanying text (judges are allowed to cross-examine witnesses in some jurisdictions).
302. See, e.g., In re "Judge Anonymous," 590 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Okla. 1978); MINN. R.
BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 10(b), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 771 (1980) (rule makes specific reference to counsel on behalf of judge); cf. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172,
176 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam) (judge not denied right to counsel; simply failed to retain one
who could arrange schedule to represent him).
303. See, e.g., In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 30, 241 So. 2d 469, 479 (1970); In re Bates, 555
S.W.2d 420, 434 (Tex. 1977); Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 2; cf. In re
Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270, 278 (Mo. 1980) (per curiam) (respondent-judge cross-examined
witnesses whose testimony formed basis of several charges against judge).
304. See notes 113-303 supra and accompanying text.
305. See notes 219-25, 232-34, 259-61 supra and accompanying text.
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be heard. Alternatively, the power of the Board should be limited to
issuing a warning or a reprimand. Third, the period allowed for discovery should be extended to allow a judge time to prepare adequately for
the formal hearing. Finally, because of the adversarial function of the
Board, it is recommended that all formal proceedings be conducted by a
30 6
If
lawyer or judge who is not a present or past member of the Board.
such a rule were implemented both the appearance and possibility of
07
impropriety or bias by the Board would be avoided.3
306. The rules provide that the factfinder at the hearing is either the Board, a threemember panel of the Board, or a referee who is either a judge or a lawyer. See MINN. R.
BD. JUDICIAL STANDARDS 9(a)(l), (3), 9 MINN. STAT. 765, 771 (1980). The Board's general practice is "to have an independent referee serve as the factfinder during the formal
hearing." Interview with George J. Kurvers, supra note 57, at 2. This practice should be
adopted formally as a rule of procedure.
307. But cf. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 307 (Alaska 1975) (no due process violation for
Commission to have option to refer matter to master or hear matter itself). As the McDonough court noted, in the future the Board could seek to avoid the assumption of an adversary posture. See note 180 supra.
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